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Employees with mental illnesses have had difficulty obtaining relief
under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), which was prima-
rily intended by Congress to protect workers with physical impairments. An
individual is "disabled" and thus shielded from discrimination by the ADA
if she demonstrates (1) that she suffers from "a physical or mental impair-
ment that substantially limits" a "major life activity," (2) a "record of" suf-
feringfrom such an impairment, or (3) a perception by her employer that she
suffers from such an impairment.
The author argues that this three-pronged definition of disability
presents unique problems for plaintiffs afflicted with mental illnesses, as op-
posed to physical impairments. First, mental illnesses are difficult to diag-
nose and are not usually readily apparent. Second, because mental illnesses
frequently manifest themselves through either spotty attendance at worh or
difficulty coping with stress, mentally ill plaintiffs are often judged to be "not
otherwise qualified"for their jobs. However, under Sutton v. United Air
Lines, Inc., plaintiffs who "mitigate the effects" of their impairments
through medication are denied ADA relief. The author further notes that
this Supreme Court ruling should lead many plaintiffs to attempt to establish
a disability under the second and third prongs. Yet these plaintiffs face a
difficult evidentiay burden that requires them to prove that their employer
believed they suffered from a specific, ADA-covered disability.
The author proposes to address these problems through an alternative
statutory scheme that would maintain a stringent burden of prooffor plain-
tiffs seeking workplace accommodations for their impairments, as compared
to those plaintiffs who only assert that they suffered an adverse employment
action based on the "myths, fears, or stereotypes" associated with an actual or
perceived impairment.
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INTRODUCTION
Congress drafted the Americans with Disabilities Act of 19901
(ADA) with physically impaired individuals in mind, but it applied the
statute to the mentally ill as well.2 Thus, the courts have been saddled
with the task of attempting to shoehorn mental illness cases into an
inapt statutory scheme. In struggling to balance the statutory require-
ments of the ADA with the realities of the workplace, courts have pro-
duced inconsistent results. Consequently, mentally ill workers have
found little protection under the ADA.
In general, actions by mentally ill individuals under the employ-
ment provisions of the ADA3 fail due to the litigants' inability to satisfy
the Act's definition of disability.4 In three 1999 decisions-Sutlon v.
United Air Lines, Inc.;5 Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc.;6 and Albert-
son's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg-the United States Supreme Court provided
employers with a valuable tool to combat ADA claims, thereby compli-
cating the existing obstacles facing mentally ill plaintiffs and leaving
the statute largely unworkable for them. In each case, the Court held
that mitigating measures, such as medication, must be considered
when evaluating whether an individual is "disabled" under the ADA.8
Initially, this Note analyzes the shortcomings of the Act as applied
to the mentally ill and the resulting judicial confusion. It will also
attempt to identify the emerging trends in ADA mental illness cases
following Sutton. First, following the Court's mitigating measures rul-
ings, lower courts will more carefully scrutinize the effectiveness of
psychotropic drugs and whether the side effects of these medications
are themselves disabling.9 Second, many claimants who may have pre-
viously been considered disabled will now fall outside the statutory
coverage because their medications effectively control their illnesses.
These individuals will increasingly argue that they have been victims
1 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
2 See infra notes 123-34 and accompanying text.
3 Title I of the ADA, which is the focus of this Note, addresses disability discrimina-
tion in the employment context. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117.
4 Although many scholars have examined the shortcomings of the ADA's definition
of disability, see, eg., Robert L Burgdorf, Jr., "Substantialy Limitd" Protedian from Disability
Discrimination: The Special Treatment Model and Misconsinictions of the Dfinition of Disabiliy, 42
Viw L RV. 409, 431-36 (1997), and the general failures of plaintiffs under the Act, see,
e-g., Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act. A Wi7ndfall for Defedans 34 LRv. C.R.-
C.L I REV. 99 (1999), a detailed analysis of the ADA's application to mental illness serves
at least two important purposes: it (1) demonstrates the unique problems mentally ill
claimants face, and (2) clearly exposes the deficiencies of the statute.
5 527 U.S. 471 (1999). Sutton was the lead case of the three decisions the Supreme
Court rendered on June 22, 1999 and will therefore be the focus of this discussion.
6 527 U.S. 516 (1999).
7 527 U.S. 555 (1999).
8 See Alhertsons, 527 U.S. at 565-66; Murplky, 527 U.S. at 521; Sulton, 527 U.S. at 482.
9 See discussion infra Part IV.A.
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of stereotypical attitudes toward disability, and as such, will assert
claims under the ADA's alternative definitions of disability: having a
"record of' a disability10 or being "regarded as" disabled." Third, al-
though mentally ill litigants often argue that their disabilities resulted
from a "substantial limitation" in the "major life activity" of working,12
the Sutton Court's suspicion of such a strategy'3 may necessitate that
these litigants assert claims based on other major life activities. 14 Fi-
nally, Sutton will not only alter the focus of many ADA disputes, but
will engender added inconsistencies in the application of the statute
in mental illness cases.
Part I of this Note briefly describes the relevant statutory provi-
sions of the ADA and the attendant administrative regulations. Part II
analyzes the Court's decisions in Sutton, Murphy, and Albertson's. Part
III discusses the common problems mentally ill individuals encounter
in ADA cases and in the workplace generally. Part IV examines,
through a discussion of recent judicial decisions, three prominent is-
sues that have surfaced in the wake of Sutton and the trends that are
likely to appear in mental illness cases. Finally, Part V proposes an
amended statutory scheme for Title I of the ADA that aims to incorpo-
rate the practical employer concerns underlying Sutton without sacri-
ficing the ADA's indictment of discriminatory workplace decision
making. This amended statute protects mentally ill workers by provid-
ing separate standards for individuals asserting an "actual disability"
and those claiming that an employer discriminated against them
based on stereotypes of disability.
The ADA is a confusing and frustrating piece of legislation. Con-
gress would certainly be warranted in discarding the entire statute and
starting afresh. However, this Note suggests only a partial reword-
ing-a narrow, but important revision of the existing definition of dis-
ability that attempts to embrace a middle ground between the
disability rights community and the management bar. On the one
hand, the proposal retains the current, strict formulation to the ex-
tent that the definition of disability operates to filter unfounded
claims for employment accommodations. On the other hand, when a
worker does not demand an accommodation, the revised definition is
designed to break down barriers to employment. Ideally, then, a men-
tally ill employee who can "do the job" will be unencumbered by stere-
10 See42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B) (1994).
11 See id. § 12102(2) (C); discussion infra Part 1V.B.
12 The ADA requires that claimants be "substantially limit[ed]" in 'one or more of
the[ir] major life activities" in order to establish disabled status. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (A);
see also infra Part L.A.
13 See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 491-92.
14 See discussion infra Part IV.C.
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otypical attitudes towards disability and her employer will not face
additional costs.
I
THE RELEVAr STATUTORY PROVISIONS
In enacting the ADA, Congress declared that "individuals with
disabilities are a discrete and insular minority who have been faced
with restrictions and imitations ... resulting from stereotypic assump-
tions not truly indicative of the individual ability of such individuals to
participate in, and contribute to, society."', Congress intended "to
provide a dear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimina-
tion of discrimination against individuals with disabilities."16
The ADA makes it unlawful for covered employers17 to "discrimi-
nate against a qualified individual with a disability" with regard to job
applications, hiring, discharge, or other conditions of employment) 8
A "qualified individual with a disability" is "an individual ith a disabil-
ity who... can perform the essential functions of the employment
position"'9 with or without "reasonable accommodation."20 An em-
ployer discriminates if it fails to reasonably accommodate "the known
physical or mental limitations of an othenvise qualified individual with
a disability."21
Congress adopted the ADA's definition of disability from the Re-
habilitation Act of 1973,22 which forbids discrimination against indi-
viduals with disabilities by any federal agency or any program
receiving federal funds.2 The Rehabilitation Act also requires that
government agencies submit affirmative action plans for the hiring of
disabled employees 24 and that federal contracts exceeding $10,000
15 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7).
16 Id. § 12101(b) (1).
17 The statute uses the term "covered entity," id. § 12112(a), and refers to any em-
ployer with "15 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar
weeks in the current or preceding calendar year," id. § 12111(5) (A).
18 Id. § 12112(a).
19 Id. § 12111(8).
20 The issue of what constitutes a reasonable accommodation, in the realm of both
physical and mental disabilities, has been the subject of much debate. This Note will not
provide an in-depth analysis of the issue, but will refer to it from time to time. For a
discussion of one approach to the formulation of reasonable accommodations for the
mentally ill that views the provision of accommodations "as an ongoing process, rather
than as a one-time solution," see Deborah Zuckerman, Reasonable Acornmodationsfor Peope
udth Mental Illness Under the ADA, 17 MINrAL & Pmslic.' DmslutY L REP. 311 (1993).
21 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
22 See id. § 12201 (a); Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 631 (1998).
23 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1994).
24 I& § 791(b).
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contain provisions requiring the contractor to take affirmative action
to hire disabled workers.2 5
The ADA defines "disability" as follows:
(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more of the major life activities of such individual;
(B) a record of such an impairment; or
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment.26
A great deal of ADA litigation concerns whether or not an individual
can be classified as disabled under the statutory definition.2 7
A. The First Prong: Actual Disability
The Supreme Court has explained that the determination of
whether an individual is disabled requires a three-step inquiry.28 First,
does the individual suffer from an impairment?29 Second, has the in-
dividual identified a major life activity affected by the impairment?-10
Third, does the given "impairment substantially limit[ I the major life
activity?" 31 Each of these terms-"impairment," "major life activity,"
and "substantially limits"-requires further explanation.3 2
1. Impairment
Congress granted the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion (EEOC or "Commission") authority to issue regulations imple-
menting the employment provisions of Title I of the ADA.3 3 The
EEOC regulations define a "mental impairment" as "[a]ny mental or
psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, organic brain syn-
drome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabili-
ties."3 4 In its 1997 EEOC Enforcement Guidance: Psychiatric Disabilities
25 Id. § 793(a).
26 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
27 See Arlene B. Mayerson, Restoring Regard for the "Regarded As" Prong: Giving Effect to
Congressional Intent 42 Vii.. L. Rnv. 587, 587 (1997).
28 See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 631 (1998).
29 See id.
30 See id.
31 Id.
32 As one commentator has noted: "No ADA definition or term has become more
important for understanding the antidiscrimination rights of persons with mental disabili-
ties than the definition of mental disability itself." JOHN W. PARRY, AM. BAR Ass'N, MENTAL
DisAmirEs AND THE AMERICANS wrrH DIsABiuTEs Acr 9 (2d ed. 1997).
33 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (1994). In addition, the Commission "may render technical as-
sistance to individuals and institutions that have rights or duties" under Title I. Id.
§ 12206(c) (1). In 1992, the EEOC published its Technical Assistance MlanuaL See EQtAL
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL FOR THE AMERiLANS
wrrH DisAum Aar (1992).
34 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (2) (2000). Although the Court's recent decisions will impact
individuals suffering from each of these impairments and, in particular, the learning dis-
abled, the discussion in this Note is limited to emotional or mental illness.
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and the Americans with Disabilities Act43 5 the Commission suggested that
courts and attorneys use the American Psychiatric Association's Diag-
nostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV) as a reference
in mental illness cases.36 From the DSM-IV, the Commission gleaned
a list of mental or emotional illnesses that it considered ADA "impair-
ments." These "include major depression, bipolar disorder, anxiety
disorders (which include panic disorder, obsessive compulsive disor-
der, and post-traumatic stress disorder), schizophrenia, and personal-
ity disorders."37
2. Major Life Activities
According to the initial EEOC regulations concerning the ADA,
major life activities include "caring for oneself, performing manual
tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and
working."38 However, in its subsequent EEOC Psychiatric Guidance, the
Commission suggested an expanded list of major life activities. The
additional activities include thinking, concentrating, interacting with
others, and sleeping.3 9
3. Substantially Limits
Regarding the "substantially limits" requirement, the EEOC states
the following:
The term substantially limits means:
(i) Unable to perform a major life activity that the average per-
son in the general population can perform; or
(ii) Significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or dura-
tion under which an individual can perform a particular major life
activity as compared to the condition, manner, or duration under
which the average person in the general population can perform
that same major life activity. 40
In order to determine whether an individual is substantially limited, a
court should consider the following, on a case-by-case basis: 41 the na-
ture and severity of the impairment, the duration of the impairment,
35 EEOC Enforcement Guidance Ps.)ddatric Disabilities and the Americans uith Disabilities
Ac 3 EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) No. 224, at N:2331 (May 1997) (hereinafter EEOCPchi.
atric Guidance].
36 Id. at N:2331; Am. PSYcHIATRic Ass'N, DLGNOSTIC ,ND STATIStKaL MNVAL OF
MNerAL DisoRDwIs (4th ed. 1994). Courts addressing mental illness issues in the emplq6
ment context often cite the DSM-IV. .g., Boldini v. Postmaster Gen. U.S. Postal Serv., 928
F. Supp. 125, 130 (D.N.H. 1995) (addressing claim under the Rehabilitation Act).
37 EEOC Psychiatric Guidance, supra note 35, at N:2331.
38 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i). This is not an exhaustive list. Il.
39 See EEOC Pgddatric Guidance, supra note 35, at N:2332.
40 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) (1).
41 See 29 C.F.R pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(j).
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and, the permanent impact of the impairment.42 In addition, the
EEOC states that claimants should only raise the major life activity of
working as a last resort.43 Nonetheless, most mentally ill plaintiffs as-
sert "working" as the major life activity in which they are substantially
limited.44
The EEOC proposes a separate and more detailed analysis for
those cases concerning the major life activity of working. In order to
be substantially limited in working, one must be "significantly re-
stricted in the ability to perform either a class ofjobs or a broad range
of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having
comparable training, skills and abilities. '45 Although an individual
need not be completely unable to work, one is not substantially lim-
ited in working if he is only unable to perform a singlejob or a narrow
range of jobs.46 This class-of-jobs directive has caused innumerable
problems for plaintiffs in ADA litigation.47 As one authority warned,
the courts have been apt to find that an employee who is capable of
performing "any job other than his own" is not disabled.48
42 See 29 C.F.tR § 1630.20) (2). Courts disagree as to the exact length of illness neces-
sary to invoke the ADA. One authority stated that although courts have required anywhere
between two and twelve months of symptoms, "'a safe rule of thumb is 90 days.'" Employ.
ment Discrimination-Disability: Speakers at Law Conference on ADA Discuss Ways to Avoid Sum-
maiy Judgment, 67 U.S.L.W. 2254 (1998) (hereinafter Avoiding Summaiy Judgment] (quoting
David Fram, director of ADA and EEO services at the National Employment Law Institute);
cf Ogborn v. United Food & Comm. Workers, No. 98C 4623, 2000 WL 1409855, at *7
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 25, 2000) (holding that two months of severe depression did not establish
disability).
43 See 29 C.F.R, pt. 1630, app. § 1630.20) ("If an individual is substantially limited in
any other major life activity, no determination should be made as to whether the individual
is substantially limited in working.").
44 See Sidney R. Steinberg, Sup. Ct. Defines "Disability" Under Americans with Disabilities
Act, ANDREWS EMP. Lrrlc. REP., July 7, 1999, at 3 (stating that "'working' seems to be the
'major life activity' most often cited in claims brought under the Act").
45 29 C.FR. § 1630.2(j)(3).
46 29 C.F.1R pt. 1630, app. § 1630.20). In addition, the EEOC recommends that
courts consider: (1) the geographical area to which the individual has access; (2) the num-
ber and type of jobs in the geographical area utilizing similar training and skills from
which the individual is disqualified because of the impairment ("class ofjobs"); and (3) the
number and type ofjobs in the geographical area not utilizing similar training and skills
from which the individual is disqualified because of the impairment ("broad range of
jobs"). Id. § 16300) (3) (ii) (A)-(C).
47 See R. Bales, Once is Enough: Evaluating When a Person is Substantially Limited in Her
Ability to Work, 11 Hors-RA LAB. LJ. 203, 232-33 (1993).
48 Avoiding Summary Judgment, supra note 42, at 2254 (emphasis added) (recounting
statement of David Fram, director of ADA and EEO services at the National Employment
Law Institute).
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B. The "Record of' and "Regarded as" Prongs
In 1974, Congress amended the Rehabilitation Act's definition of
"handicapped individual,"49 introducing two alternative criteria for
coverage which were later adopted by the ADA's drafters: 0 having a
"record of' a substantially limiting impairment 51 and being "regarded
as" having a substantially limiting impairment.52 In essence, these
prongs "indicate that disability can be socially constructed."53
1. The Second Prong: "Record of' a Disability
The "record of' prong of the definition prevents discrimination
against an individual who "has a history of, or has been misclassified as
having, a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one
or more major life activities."54 Congress thus intended to protect in-
dividuals who have recovered from disabling impairments, but who
nonetheless face the specter of discrimination due to antiquated ste-
reotypes about those impairments.55
In School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 6 the Supreme Court
decided a Rehabilitation Act case in favor of a plaintiff with a "record
49 Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L No. 93-516, § 111(a), 88 Stat.
1617, 1619 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 706(8) (B) (1994)). See generally Burgdorf,
supra note 4, at 431-36 (discussing the history and impact of the 1974 amendments to the
Rehabilitation Act).
In 1992, Congress replaced the phrase "handicapped" in the Rehabilitation Act uith
"disabled." Rehabilitation ActAmendments of 1992, Pub. L No. 102-569, §§ 102(f) (1) (A),
(f) (2) (B), (f) (3), (p), 105 Stat. 4344, 4348, 4349, 4356-58 (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. § 706(8) (1994)).
50 See S. REP. No. 101-116, at 23 (1989); see also Lisa Eichhorn, MajorLitigation Aclhtities
Regarding Major Life Activities: The Failure of the 'Disabili" Definition in the Americans uith
Disabilities Act of 1990, 77 N.C. L REv. 1405, 1427 (1999) (noting that the drafters of the
ADA "found the previous definition in the Rehabilitation Act to be unworkable").
51 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B) (1994).
52 Id § 12102(2)(C).
53 Eichhorn, supra note 50, at 1432.
54 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k) (2000). It is essential that the record relied upon by the
employer indicates that the individual "has or has had a substantially limiting impairment."
M pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(k).
55 SeeS. REt. No. 93-1297, at 38-39 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6373, 6389
(noting that the "record of" prong, added as part of the Rehabilitation Act Amendments of
1974, covers "persons who have recovered-in whole or in part-from a handicapping
condition, such as a mental or neurological illness, a heart attack, or cancer"); id. at 50,
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6373, 6400 (noting that the "record of" and "regarded as"
prongs address the problem that "the American people are simply unfamiliar vMith and
insensitive to difficulties confront[ing] individuals with handicaps"); see aLso Sch. Bd. of
Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 279 (1987) (explaining that the "record of" and
.regarded as" prongs were added to reflect "Congress' concern with protecting the handi-
capped against discrimination stemming not only from simple prejudice, but also from
'archaic attitudes and laws'" (quoting S. REP. No. 93-1297, at 50, reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6373, 6400)).
56 480 U.S. 273 (1987), superseded by statute as stated in Fedro v. Reno, 21 F.3d 1391
(7th Cir. 1994).
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of' a disability.57 Addressing a claim by a teacher whose school had
terminated her for fear that her tuberculosis was contagious, the
Court ruled that the teacher's previous hospitalization established a
record of a substantially limiting impairment.5 8 The Court de-
nounced employers' "reflexive reactions"59 to individuals with disabili-
ties and, in an oft-cited discussion of the legislative history
surrounding the Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1974, stated:
"Congress acknowledged that society's accumulated myths and fears
about disability and disease are as handicapping as are the physical
limitations that flow from actual impairment. '60
2. The Third Prong: "Regarded as" Having a Disability
When Congress implemented the "regarded as" portion of the
ADA, it sought guidance in the Supreme Court's Arline ruling.61 As
with the "record of' prong, Congress included the "regarded as"
prong to protect an individual "who is rejected from ajob because of
the myths, fears and stereotypes associated with disabilities," whether
or not the person would be considered disabled under the first prong
of the definition.62 As such, the third prong "ensure[s] that persons
with medical conditions that are under control, and that therefore do
not currently limit major life activities, are not discriminated against
on the basis of their medical conditions."63
According to the EEOC, there are three ways an individual may
be "regarded as" disabled.r First, an individual might have an impair-
ment that is not substantially limiting, but that is perceived as substan-
tially limiting by his employer. 65 Second, an individual might have "an
impairment which is only substantially limiting because of the atti-
tudes of others towards the impairment."66 Finally, an employee
57 Id. at 281.
58 Id. The school board had argued that Arline's history was irrelevant because the
board had terminated her due to the "threat that her relapses of tuberculosis posed to the
health of others." Id
59 Id. at 285.
60 Id. at 284.
61 See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 30-31 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.CA.N. 445,
452-53.
62 Id. at 30, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.N. 445, 453.
63 S. REP. No. 101-116, at 24 (1989).
64 29 C.F.R pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(1) (2000) (elaborating on 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(1)).
The EEOC adopted these three formulations of the "regarded as" prong directly from the
legislative history. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 29, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
445, 452; S. REP. No. 101-116, at 23.
65 H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 29; S. REP. No. 101-116, at 23.
66 The Sutton Court conspicuously omitted this second definition in its discussion of
the "regarded as" prong. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 489 (1999)
("There are two apparent ways in which individuals may fall within this statutory definition
.... "). For further discussion of this issue, see infra notes 264-81 and accompanying text.
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might have no impairment at all but nevertheless be regarded by the
employer as having a substantially limiting impairment.67
II
THE SumRFaE COURT'S MITIGATING MAsuREs RuuNc, s
The Court's recent decisions have significantly narrowed employ-
ers' exposure to liability under the ADA by permitting courts to con-
sider mitigating measures when making individual disability
determinations. Prior to these decisions, the EEOC had declared that
"[t]he determination of whether an individual is substantially limited
in a major life activity must be made on a case by case basis, without
regard to mitigating measures such as medicines, or assistance or pros-
thetic devices."68 Eight of the nine Circuit Courts of Appeals that ini-
tially addressed the issue adopted the EEOC's position.6 9 When the
Tenth Circuit departed from this trend,70 the Supreme Court granted
certiorari on the mitigating measures question,7' and affirmed the
Tenth Circuit's decision. 72 This Part examines the three Court deci-
sions that set forth the mitigating measures standard: Sutton v. United
Air Lines, Ina,7" Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc.,74 and Albefrson's,
Inc. v. Kirkingburg.75
A. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.
Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,76 the lead case of the trilogy, con-
tained the most detailed inquiry into the mitigating measures issue.7
Sutton involved the claims of twin sisters who suffered from severe my-
opia and were, as a result of their diminished eyesight, denied employ-
ment as commercial pilots.78 With corrective lenses, each of the
petitioners had 20/20 vision or better.79 They also met the basic age,
educational, and FAA certification specifications.80 However, United
did not consider the petitioners for employment because, without
67 H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 29; S. REP. No. 101-116, at 23.
68 29 G.F.R pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(0).
69 Sutton, 527 U.S. at 495-96 & n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the First, Sec-
ond, Third, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuit Courts had construed the
ADA as defining disability "without regard to ameliorative measures").
70 See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893 (10th Cir. 1997), affd, 527 U.S.
471 (1999).
71 Suttoi4 527 U.S. at 476-77.
72 Id. at 488-89.
73 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
74 527 U.S. 516 (1999).
75 527 U.S. 555 (1999).
76 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
77 See id. at 475-76.
78 I&
79 Id. at 475.
80 Id. at 475-76.
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their corrective lenses, they did not meet the employer's minimum
vision requirement.81 The Court ruled in United's favor, holding that
the effects of corrective or mitigating measures, both positive and neg-
ative, should be considered in determining whether an individual is
substantially limited in a major life activity, and thus disabled under
the ADA.82
The Court's analysis began with a discussion of the plain meaning
of the statute. Since the words "substantially limits" appear in the pre-
sent indicative form, Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, con-
cluded that an individual must be "presently-not potentially or
hypothetically-substantially limited in order to demonstrate a disabil-
ity."83 Thus, if a person's impairment is corrected by mitigating mea-
sures, that impairment is not substantially limiting.8 4
The Court maintained that if in each case it ignored the mitigat-
ing measures the plaintiff used, it would eviscerate the legislature's
directive that "disabilities be evaluated 'with respect to an individ-
ual."'8 5 According to the Court, a contrary holding would require
lower courts "to make a disability determination based on general in-
formation about how an uncorrected impairment usually affects indi-
viduals," rather than how the impairment actually limits the individual
in question.86 The Court buttressed this reasoning by observing that if
lower courts did adhere to the EEOC approach, they could not con-
sider the negative side effects of some mitigating measures, in particu-
lar, medications.8 7
Ultimately, the Court preyed on the particular facts of the case.88
The ADA aimed to protect people with impairments that have been
81 1& at 476.
82 Id. at 482.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 482-83.
85 Id. at 483 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994)). Ironically, plaintiffs have often
used the "individualized inquiry" theory against employers they accuse of making employ-
ment decisions based on stereotypical notions of disabled persons. See Bragdon v. Abbott,
524 U.S. 624 (1998); Steinberg, supra note 44, at 4; cf Chai R. Feldblum, Definition of Disa-
bility UnderFederal Anti-Discrimination Law: What Happened? Why? and What Can We Do About
It?, 21 BERKELEYJ. EMp. & LAB. L. 91, 152 (2000) (arguing that the "individualized inquiry"
is useful for determining whether a person is qualified for a position-including what, if
any, reasonable accommodations are necessary-but not for determining whether an indi-
vidual is covered by the law).
86 Sutton, 524 U.S. at 483.
87 Id. at 484.
88 See Thomas G. Hungar & Eugene Scalia, Limiting ADA to the Disabled, 157 NJ. LJ.
714 (1999) ("These cases demonstrate how the facts of a particular case can influence the
development of legal doctrine."); Stuart TaylorJr., Conservativism in Question: ADA Decisions
Show Gray Area Among Justices' Allegiances, TEx. LAW., July 19, 1999, at 34 (noting that the
Court chose three cases that "involved employers who were sued not for anything smacking
of irrational prejudice" and that this decision reflects the Court's method "of separating
valid from invalid claims at reasonable cost").
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the basis for stereotyping and unequal treatment. 89 Outside of the
elementary school playground, however, people with poor vision have
not been victims of discrimination.90 From this premise, the Court
delved into the first section of the statute and observed that Congress
found "some 43,000,000 Americans have one or more physical or
mental disabilities." 91 If Congress had intended to include those citi-
zens whose impairments are controlled by mitigating measures, the
Court concluded, it would have cited a significantly higher number.92
In fact, more than 100 million Americans require corrective lenses
and 50 million people suffer from high blood pressure.93
The Court also rejected the sisters' "regarded as" claim-that the
airline perceived them as substantially limited in the major life activity
of working.94 The Court adhered to the EEOC's analysis9 on working
as a major life activity and noted: "Ifjobs utilizing an individual's skills
(but perhaps not his or her unique talents) are available, one is not
precluded from a substantial class ofjobs. Similarly, if a host of differ-
ent types of jobs are available, one is not precluded from a broad
range ofjobs."96 The sisters' "regarded as" claim failed because, even
if United regarded them as precluded from a position as a global air-
line pilot due to their poor vision, that did not demonstrate that the
airline regarded them as substantially limited in working. In fact, the
Court noted, the petitioners were qualified for many other pilot
jobs.97 The Court thus declared:
[A] n employer is free to decide that physical characteristics or med-
ical conditions that do not rise to the level of an impairment-such
as one's height, build, or singing voice-are preferable to others,
just as it is free to decide that some limiting, but not substantially
limiting, impairments make individuals less than ideally suited for a
job.98
89 See supra Part I.B.
90 See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 494 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (stating that "persons whose
uncorrected eyesight is poor, or who rely on daily medication for their well-being, can be
found in every social and economic class; they do not duster among the politically power-
less, nor do they coalesce as historical victims of discrimination").
91 Id. at 484 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (1994)).
92 R at 487.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 490.
95 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) (3) (2000).
96 Sutton, 527 U.S. at 492.
97 Id. at 493.
98 Id- at 490-91.
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B. Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc.
In Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc.,99 the Court applied its miti-
gating measures analysis to a United Parcel Service (UPS) employee
who suffered from high blood pressure. 100 In order to drive UPS vehi-
cles, the petitioner needed to satisfy a Department of Transportation
(DOT) health requirement that he not suffer from high blood pres-
sure.' 0 ' Although Murphy's blood pressure was well above DOT lim-
its, he was erroneously hired. 0 2 When UPS discovered the error, it
terminated the petitioner.10 3
Although Murphy was diagnosed with hypertension in childhood,
his physician testified that Murphy "can function normally and can
engage in activities that other persons normally do. °104 Reiterating
Sutton's reasoning, the Court held that the petitioner was not disabled
under the ADA. 105 The Court also determined that the petitioner was
not "regarded as" disabled because he did not introduce evidence that
UPS regarded him as unable to perform other mechanic jobs-those
that would not require him to drive commercial vehicles. 10 6
C. Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg
Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg'0 7 involved an employer who termi-
nated a truck driver with more than ten years of driving experience
because he did not meet the Department of Transportation's vision
requirements. 10 8 Hallie Kirkingburg suffered from amblyopia, a con-
dition that left him essentially blind in one eye. 10 9 The Ninth Circuit
ruled that Kirkingburg was disabled, basing its decision on the EEOC
standard for "substantially limits" that "requires a 'significant re-
strict[ion]' in an individual's manner of performing a major life activ-
ity" as compared to that of the average citizen.110
The Supreme Court rejected the Ninth Circuit's reasoning, stat-
ing that the lower court was "willing to settle for a mere difference"
rather than a truly "significant restriction.""' In the most striking
portion of the opinion, the Court maintained that the circuit court's
"disability" analysis failed to "take account of the individual's ability to
99 527 U.S. 516 (1999).
1oo Id. at 519.
101 Id.
102 Id, at 520.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 519 (internal quotation marks omitted).
105 Id. at 521, 525.
106 Id. at 524-25.
107 527 U.S. 555 (1999).
108 Id. at 558, 560.
109 See id. at 559.
110 Id. at 564-65.
111 Id.
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compensate for the impairment."11 2 According to the record, Kirk-
ingburg's "brain has developed subconscious mechanisms for coping
with [his] visual impairment and thus his body compensates for his
disability."11 The Court likened this situation, in which "the body's
own systems" enable the individual to compensate for a substantial
limitation, to those in which an individual controls an impairment
with medication.114 The Court stressed that it was engaged in a case-
by-case inquiry.115 Hence, although one with monocular vision would
ordinarily be disabled, certain individuals, like Kirkingburg, might fall
outside the statutory definition.' 16
mH
THE MENTALLY ILL IN THE WORKPLACE AND THE ADA
Congress has recognized that discrimination against the disabled
"often results from false presumptions, generalizations, mispercep-
tions, patronizing attitudes, ignorance, irrational fears, and pernicious
mythologies."" 7 Although modem society has begun to look beyond
these stereotypic attitudes with regard to the physically disabled, those
suffering from mental illness are consistently stigmatized, even within
the disabled community. 118 As one scholar noted: "Bias against the
mentally ill is one of the last invisible and socially acceptable forms of
discrimination, perpetuated by our use of uncritically accepted 'com-
mon sense' and stereotype-based reasoning about mental illness
. ... "119 Still, more than one in five American adults have a
diagnosable mental disorder in a given year.'2 0
Employees suffering from mental illness are a constant concern
for employers. Between July 26, 1992 and September 30, 1999, ADA
charges based on mental or emotional impairments have represented
112 I& at 565.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 565-66.
115 Id. at 566.116 Id. at 567.
117 H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 30 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 311.
118 SeeJean Campbell & Caroline L Kaufmann, Equality and Difference in the ADA: Unin-
tended Consequenc for Employment of People with Mental Health Disabilitihs in MN.u.. Disor,.
DER, WORK DISABILTY, AND THE L-ow 221, 224 (Richard J. Bonnie &John Monahan cds.,
1997). In a 1999 article, Lisa Eichhorn provides a lengthy description of the disabilities
movement as background to an interesting criticism of the ADA's definition of "disability."
Eichhom, supra note 50, at 1409-19. However, nowhere in her recounting of the move-
ment's birth and expansion does the author mention te mentally ill. See id.
119 Stephanie Proctor Miler, Keeping the Promise: TheADA and EmploymentDisaimination
on the Basis of Pddatric Disabilit;, 85 CAt. L REv. 701, 702-03 (1997).
120 Laura Lee Hall, Afaking the ADA MorhforPeople with Psychiatric Disabilities, in Ma-,crAt.
DIsoRDEP, WORK DIxmArry, AND THE LAw, supra note 118, at 241,248 (citing 1993 National
Institute of Mental Health statistics).
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an increasing perdentage of all claims filed with the EEOC.'21 In 1998
and 1999, individuals brought claims based on mental impairments
more often than any other type of impairment.1 22
A. Societal Hurdles: Contrasting Mental and Physical Disabilities
The difficulties facing mentally ill individuals who assert ADA
claims grow from longstanding societal misconceptions and the inher-
ent inconsistencies between the ADA and the nature of mental illness
itself. An underlying presumption of the ADA is the belief that dis-
abled individuals can "do the job." In many respects, however, it ap-
pears Congress did not apply this presumption to the mentally ill.123
Early advocates of the ADA were "by and large, highly educated
and disciplined professionals with good self-esteem and assertiveness
skills. They were people who had risen above the societal and medical
121 See U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY CONIM'N, CUMULATivE ADA CLARGE
DATA-RECEIPTS: JULY 26, 1992-SEPr. 30, 1999, at http://wwv.eeoc.gov/stats/ada-re-
ceipts.html (last modifiedJan. 12, 2000).
122 See id. Because the EEOC website cited herein does not include a separate percent-
age for mental illness charges generally, the author added together the statistics for the
separate categories of mental illness (Anxiety Disorder, Cumulative Trauma Disorder, De-
pression, Manic Depressive Disorder, Other Psychological Disorder, and Schizophrenia)
and determined that they constitute a greater percentage of claims than any other cate-
gory. The second-most common category of claims is Orthopedic and Structural Impair-
ments of the Back.
Although specific statistics do not exist for mental impairment cases, ADA claimants
are, in general, rarely successful. According to Professor Ruth Colker's examination of
ADA cases in federal courts between 1992 and 1998, employers won favorable court deci-
sions in more than 93% of those cases decided on the merits at the trial court level, and
prevailed in 84% of the cases that were appealed. See Colker, supra note 4, at 100-03.
Colker attributes these staggering results, in large part, to the fact that trial courts abuse
the summaryjudgment device in ADA cases. See id. at 110. In particular, Colker states that
courts have been substituting their own judgment for that ofjuries on purely factual ques-
tions regarding what constitutes a "disability," who is "qualified," and what job functions
are "essential." See id. at 110-115; see also Douglas A. Blair, Employees Sufferingfrom Bipolar
Disorder or Clinical Depression: Fighting an Uphill Battle for Protection Under Title I of the Amed.
cans with Disabilities Act, 29 SEToN HALL L. REv. 1347, 1360 (1999) ("[Elmployees claiming
discrimination on the basis of a mental disability involving bipolar disorder or clinical de-
pression have been mostly unsuccessful in litigating their claims."); Matthew Diller, Judicial
Backlash, theADA and the CivilRights Model 21 BEMuEL'J. ENIP. & LAB. L. 19, 21 (2000) ("In
light of the court decisions, it is easy to criticize the draftsmanship of the ADA. But the text
itself does not mandate the narrow approach that the courts have taken,").
123 A survey of the legislative history reveals that both Congress and those experts who
testified before it primarily contemplated the challenges of individuals with physical disa-
bilities. The legislators' and scholars' practical considerations, therefore, focused on how
the legislation would apply to these individuals only. The reports on reasonable accommo-
dations expose this shortcoming. Whereas Congress announced that both physical and
mental impairments might qualify as disabilities, see 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (A) (1994), none
of the hypothetical situations presented to illustrate the application of the legislation and
the use of accommodations incorporate mentally ill employees. See, e.g., I-I.R. REP. No.
101-485, pt. 2, at 33-34 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 314-16; S. REP. No. 101-
116, at 28-36 (1989).
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obstacles presented by their disabilities." 12 4 Their statute protected
people who could "compete with other applicants and employees in
spite of having a disability."125 Most of these trailblazers, however, had
physical, not mental impairments.
A physically disabled individual's impairments are both visible
and involuntary-most people suspect that a wheelchair-bound per-
son would prefer to walk.126 In this regard, the ADA identified physi-
cally impaired individuals and encouraged them to function
"normally," providing them with the necessary accommodations. Con-
currently, Congress attempted to dissolve preconceptions and rein-
force notions that the physically disabled should be admired for
perseverance. 12 7
On the other hand, mental illness is often perceived as volun-
tary-mere laziness or irrationality-and, moreover, is not readily ap-
parent.1 28 When an employee is unproductive, we assume she lacks a
solid work ethic. Because we do not detect that she suffers from major
depression-she does not look disabled-we reinforce this notion of
voluntarism.129 In addition, since we have comparatively little infor-
mation on psychological phenomena, society is generally suspicious of
those affected by mental illness.130
As such, many employers and courts believe that individuals who
do not have severe mental disorders abuse the law-that people with
minor emotional problems conjure up vague claims of stress disorders
and threaten employers with ADA litigation in order to gain "conces-
124 Christopher G. Bell, The Americans with Disabilities Ad), Mental Disabilio, and ISo, in
MENTrAL DisoRDER, WoRK DmABiLr, AND THE Lw, supra note 118, at 203, 204.
125 Id. at 204-05.
126 Campbell & Kaufmann, supra note 118, at 223.
127 See i& (noting that physically disabled individuals who "are able to perform major
social roles... are usually admired"); ef. supra note 117 and accompanying text.
128 See Campbell & Kaufinan, supra note 118, at 223-24.
129 Id. One commentator contests the common notion that mental disabilities should
be distinguished because they are "hidden." Blair, supra note 122, at 1395. Blair states that
he is
dubious of such generalizations, particularly when considering the more
severe mental illnesses such as bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, and major
depression. Anyone who has observed a delusional or paranoid schizo-
phrenic would likely scoff at the notion that such a mental disorder is in
any way inconspicuous.... Simply because a mental illness is more difficult
to diagnose ... does not necessarily imply that it is elusive... Nonetheless,
when somebody is suffering from a severe mental illness such as schizophre-
nia, it should be apparent that the individual is suffering from some mental
disorder, albeit one that might not lend itself to easy diagnosis.
Id. at 1396.
130 See Peter David Blanck & Mollie Weighner Marti, Attitudes, Behavior and the Emp!u-
ment Provisions of the Ameriecans with Disabilities Act, 42 Viu.. L RE%,. 345, 390 (1997) (discuss-
ing studies indicating that employers are more apprehensive ith mentally ill employees
than they are with those who are physically impaired).
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sions."131 In this view, only two types of mental impairment exist: total
debilitation and mere phobia.132
One explanation for the judiciary's distrust is that a mentally ill
individual or his counsel often cannot precisely describe the individ-
ual's impairment or, in particular, how he is limited by the impair-
ment.133 A comment by the Second Circuit in response to a plaintiff
asserting a substantial limitation in the major life activity of "everyday
mobility" illustrates this predicament: "[The plaintiff] narrows the
frame of reference and hypothesizes a major life activity called 'every-
day mobility,' which he then defines (so far as he does attempt to define it)
largely by means of examples that are coextensive with his
symptoms."'3 4
B. The Catch-22 of Disability and Qualification
ADA claimants are faced with a catch-22 relating to the dual re-
quirements of disabled status and qualification for the position. As
stated above, "a qualified individual with a disability" is "an individual
vith a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can
perform the essential functions of the employment position that such
individual holds or desires."'1 35 Thus, the individual must initially
demonstrate that her impairment substantially limits a major life activ-
ity.136 Then, she must establish that she is "otherwise qualified"-that
131 See RichardJ. Bonnie, Work Disability and the Fabric of Mental Health Law: An Introduc'
tion, in MENTAL DISORDER, WORK DisABLtrv, AND THE LAw, supra note 118, at 1, 4-5; see also
Blanck & Marti, supra note 130, at 374 (noting that employers and coworkers often believe
that accommodations provided for mentally ill employees involve "special privileges");
Eichhorn, supra note 50, at 1426 (discussing "fear that people who are not 'truly disabled'
will somehow take advantage of antidiscrimination laws"); L.M. Sixel, Law on Disabled Read
Differently, Hous. CHRON.,July 5, 1996, at 1 ("Employers tend to be most accommodating if
they can see why someone must be assisted-like an employee in a wheelchair. Employees
with less visible problems such as mental illnesses, chronic fatigue syndrome or neurologi-
cal diseases don't get as much employer support.").
132 See, e.g., Reeves v.Johnson Controls World Servs., Inc., 140 F.3d 144, 152-53 (2d Cir.
1998) (noting that plaintiff suffering from "Panic Disorder with Agoraphobia" did not a,-
sert an inability to leave home or travel to work). Of course, if Reeves had claimed an
inability to leave home or the like, the court would doubtless have found the plaintiff "not
otherwise qualified," an issue discussed infra Part III.B.
133 Reeves, 140 F.3d at 152. A similar problem often arises in courts' analyses of
whether the employer was "on notice" that the employee was disabled. See infra Part 1II.C.
134 Reeves, 140 F.3d at 152 (emphasis added). Although wheelchair-bound individuals
had previously raised "everyday mobility" in public accommodation Rehabilitation Act
cases, see id. at 150-51 n.4 (citing Leary v. Crapsey, 566 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1977); United
Handicapped Fed'n v. Andre, 558 F.2d 413 (8th Cir. 1977); Lloyd v. Reg'l Transp. Auth.,
548 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1977)), the court refused to recognize the theory in this context.
For a criticism of the Reeves decision, see Eichhorn, supra note 50, at 1443-44.
135 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994).
136 Id. § 12102(2).
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she can perform the job's essential functions.13 7 Yet, the "otherwise
qualified" criterion produces a trap for claimants: an individual must
demonstrate that her impairment rises to the level of "substantially
limiting" while simultaneously proving that this limitation does not
prevent her from executing the essential functions of the position.lss
This catch-22 is particularly troublesome in mental illness cases.
Individuals with mental illnesses face two common problems at
work: (1) they have attendance difficulties, many of which result from
the psychotropic drugs they use to treat their illnesses;139 and (2) they
have trouble handling stress, a problem which often manifests itself in
concentration lapses, interpersonal problems, and general
misconduct.' 40
As a result of these common problems, plaintiffs' cases are rou-
tinely dismissed as a matter of law, with courts declaring the mentally
ill individual "not otherwise qualified." 41 In doing so, courts pro-
claim that predictable attendance14 2 and handling stress without vio-
lating conduct standards' 43 are essential functions of every job.
137 Id § 12111(8) (also indicating that, in determining essential job functions, courts
should emphasize the employer's requirements and defer to employer judgment when
reasonable). The EEOC suggests that the "qualified" inquiry is tio-pronged. First, the
individual must meet the basic requirements for the position, such as the necessary educa-
tion and experience. Second, the person must be able to "perform te essential functions
of the position... with or without reasonable accommodation." &e 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m)
(2000).
138 PA lRY, supra note 32, at 29; Steven S. Locke, The Incredible Shrinking Protected Class:
Redefining the Scope of Disability Under the Americans uith Disabilities Act, 68 U. COLo. L RE%.
107, 127-28 (1997); Mayerson, supra note 27, at 587 ("These restrictivejudicial interpreta-
tions of the ADA reflect, at best, a lack of understanding of the statute and, at worst, a
blatant hostility towards the profound goals of the ADA.").
139 See Zuckerman, supra note 20, at 316;Jon AccowM.tooxroN Nrrwom-, Accou.MMoDa.
TION IDEAS FOR PERSONS WITH PscntA-rAic Dwnis mEs, at http://%ww,.jan.vu.edu/media/
Psychiatric.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2000).
140 See Zuckerman, supra note 20, at 314. Deborah Zuckerman explained:
People with depression... may face episodes of despair and hopelessness
that make it difficult to work. People with bipolar illness may experience
mood shifts from extreme highs to deep lows which may affect their pro-
ductivity. Generally, individuals with mental illness have difficult) coping
with stress, which may precipitate additional problems in the work place.
Each employee with a mental illness will be affected differently, however,
depending on the symptoms, severity, and duration of the illness.
Id.
141 See Blair, supra note 122, at 1393; cf I LEN I, LusoN, ErA., E.trLomIEN-r Dscrusn.
NATION § 8.08(2) (2000) (discussing Title VII racial discrimination cases and suggesting
that, rather than at the "qualification" stage, performance problems should only enter the
analysis when an employer asserts such problems as a nondiscriminatory reason for an
employment action).
142 Eg., Hendry v. GTE N., Inc., 896 F. Supp. 816. 825 (N.D. Ind. 1995).
'43 !Kg., Martin v. Gen. Mfills, Inc., No. 95C2846, 1996 WL 648721, at '7 (N.D. 111. 1996)
("The ADA does not protect people from the general stresses of the workplace.").
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1. Attendance Problems
Several courts have held that an employee who cannot meet the
employer's attendance requirements cannot be qualified-one "who
does not come to work, cannot perform any of his job functions, es-
sential or otherwise."144 The EEOC, however, proposes occasional
leaves of absence and workday breaks, along with part-time scheduling
as reasonable accommodations for the mentally ill. 145 Yet, although
some scheduling flexibility might be acceptable, it would be quite un-
reasonable to forbid an employer from requiring predictable attend-
ance of its employees. 146
One of the most significant problems with accommodating the
tardiness and absenteeism of the mentally ill is that employers cannot
guarantee its success. Unlike the physically disabled, who can more
often be accommodated through a consistent system or a permanent
workspace modification, a mentally disabled employee's needs are fre-
quently varied and unpredictable.147 In general, courts have held that
when "the accommodation the plaintiff seeks is simply to be allowed
to work only when her illness permits," such an accommodation
would result in undue hardship on the employer.' 48
2. Stress and Conduct Problems
A personality conflict with a coworker or supervisor, even one
that produces depression or anxiety, does not itself establish ADA dis-
ability status. 149 However, asJudge Richard Posner stated in Palmer v.
Circuit Court,'5 0 "a personality conflict" or "other source[ ] of normal
144 Tyndall v. Nat'l Educ. Ctrs., 31 F.3d 209, 213 (4th Cir. 1994); see Carr v. Reno, 23
F.3d 525, 530 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Mancini v. Gen. Elec. Co., 820 F. Supp. 141, 147 (D. Vt.
1993).
145 EEOC ychiatric Guidance, supra note 35, at N:2338.
146 See Hendiy, 896 F. Supp. at 825 (stating that "regular attendance at work is an essen-
tial function of virtually all jobs"); see also Sarah Starnes, Note, Psychiatric Disabilities & tle
ADA: An Analysis of Conventional Defenses & EEOC Guidelines, 18 REv. LMNG. 181, 186 (1999)
("Although some flexibility in scheduling might be expected as a reasonable accommoda-
tion, an employer can require predictable attendance as an essential function of most
jobs.").
147 PAmry, supra note 32, at 57 ("Some people with mental illnesses find that the irregu-
lar and episodic nature of their illnesses interfere [sic] with the steady, regular demands of
the work place."); Louis Pechman, MentalDisabilities in the Workplace, N.Y. LJ., Mar. 2, 1994,
at 1 ("Accommodating an individual's psyche... is an inherently elusive task.").
148 Walders v. Garrett, 765 F. Supp. 303, 313 (E.D. Va. 1991); see also Hendry, 896 F.
Supp. at 826-27 (stating that accommodation of employee's unpredictable absenteeism
problem as a result of migraine headaches would cause her employer "undue hardship").
The ADA does not require an employer to provide a reasonable accommodation if it would
work an "undue hardship" on the employer's business. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b) (5) (A)
(1994).
149 Palmer v. Circuit Court, 117 F.3d 351, 352 (7th Cir. 1997).
150 117 F.3d 351 (7th Cir. 1997).
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stress" could "trigger[ ] a serious mental illness that is in turn
disabling."' 15
Nevertheless, the ADA allows employers to set conduct standards
and require that all employees meet them. Thus, an employer can
terminate an employee, whether disabled or not, for failing to meet
those standards as long as they are "job-related" and "consistent with
business necessity. " 152 For instance, in Paner, an employee suffering
from major depression and a delusional/paranoid disorder
threatened her supervisor.'5 3 The court determined that the plaintiff
was, in fact, disabled. 15 4 Yet the fact that her misconduct was "precipi-
tated by a mental illness dl[id] not present an issue under the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act"155 because, by threatening her supervisor,
Palmer became disqualified.' 5 6
C. Accommodating Only Known Disabilities
An employer must provide reasonable accommodations only for
known disabilities.' 57 Because mental and emotional impairments are
generally not obvious, "many ADA claims will fail simply because the
employer was never on notice that an employee was disabled and re-
quired special accommodation." 58 As one court noted: "The ADA
does not require clairvoyance." 5 9
In fact, courts have carefully distinguished between knowledge of
an impairment and knowledge of a limitation resulting from that im-
151 IM. at 352 (noting also that the court's "only point is to distinguish between the
nondisabling trigger of a disabling mental illness and the mental illness itself').
152 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6).
153 Palmer, 117 F.3d at 352.
154 Id.
'55 Id.
156 Id. Several commentators have attackedJudge Posner's reasoning in Palne ckim-
ing that he ignored the ADA's more stringent requirement that an employee can be sin-
gled out only if she poses a "direct threat" to the safety of others. &e42 U.S.C. § 12113(b).
Many courts seem to avoid the "direct threat" analysis by simply finding tie employee "not
otherwise qualified." See; &g., EEOC v. Amego, Inc., 110 F.d 135, 144 (1st Cir. 1997);
Mazzarella v. U.S. Postal Serv., 849 F. Supp. 89, 96 (D. Mass. 1994). For detailed discus-
sions of this issue, see Karen Dill Danforth, Note, Reading Reasonableness Out of the ADA:
Responding to Threats by Employees with Mental Illness Following Palmer, 85 V,. L RE%,. 661
(1999); Starnes, supra note 146.
157 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b) (5) (A).
158 Starnes, supra note 146, at 184. In Miller v. National Casually Co., 61 F.3d 627 (8th
Cir. 1995), a plaintiff with manic depression told her superior that she needed a few days
off because she "'could not take the stress of [her] job'" and had family problems. Id. at
629. When she did not return on the scheduled date, the plaintiffs sister called the office
and stated that the plaintiff was "'mentally falling apart" and that the familywas "tring to
get her into the hospital.'" Id. The plaintiff had never informed her employer that she
suffered from a mental impairment until after receiving her termination letter. Id. at 630.
Thus, despite the sister's statements, the court held the company acted reasonably when it
failed to recognize that the plaintiff suffered from an ADA-covered disability. Sme id.
159 Hedberg v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co., 47 F.3d 928, 934 (7th Cir. 1995).
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pairment.' 60 It is the limitation, not the impairment, that an em-
ployer must accommodate.1 61 Once an employer is aware of a
limitation, the EEOC suggests that the employer and employee work
together to institute an effective accommodation. 162 In the end,
though, the employee must request and specifically identify the ac-
commodation. x63 Of course, to do so, the disabled person must have
the "self-awareness, knowledge, and communication skills" to engage
in useful interaction. 64
However, employees with mental illnesses may not be "sufficiently
cognizant of the fact that they have a mental illness."' 65 For example,
those suffering from depression or bipolar disorder may not be the
first to recognize their problems because of the gradual nature of the
illnesses. 166 Other illnesses, like schizophrenia, often render the indi-
vidual incapable of comprehending reality.167 Moreover, as one au-
thority noted: "Denial is a common aspect of many mental
160 E.g., Taylor v. Principal Fin. Group, 93 F.3d 155, 164 (5th Cir. 1996).
161 See id. In Taylor, the Fifth Circuit turned the purpose of the ADA against the plain-
tiff, stating- "[T]he ADA does not require an employer to assume that an employee with a
disability suffers from a limitation. In fact, better public policy dictates the opposite pre-
sumption: that disabled employees are not limited in their abilities to adequately perform
theirjobs." Id. It appears the court substituted the common version of the word "disabil-
ity" (as opposed to the ADA's definition) for the statutory term "impairment."
As a general proposition, the Fifth Circuit's approach seems a sensible and necessary
component in the struggle to alleviate stereotypical assumptions about disabilities. Moreo-
ver, it should certainly apply in the nebulous area of psychological diagnoses, where labels
are almost irrelevant without individual inquiries. The American Psychiatric Association
stated that "there is no assumption that each category of mental disorder is a completely
discrete entity with absolute boundaries dividing it from other mental disorders or from no
mental disorder." AM. PSYCHiATRC Ass'N, supra note 36, at xxii. The Supreme Court has
also addressed this difficulty: "At one time or another every person exhibits some abnormal
behavior which might be perceived by some as symptomatic of a mental or emotional dis-
order, but which is in fact within a range of conduct that is generally acceptable." Adding-
ton v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426-27 (1979); see also Burgdorf, supra note 4, at 521 (discussing
the continuum of mental health and the blurry boundaries between mental health and
mental disorder).
162 See 29 C.F.RL § 1630.2(o) (3) (2000) (proposing that employer "initiate an informal,
interactive process" with disabled individual); see also Gile v. United Airlines, Inc., 213 F.3d
365, 373 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding employer liable for failure to engage in interactive pro-
cess with mentally disabled employee).
163 See Avoiding Summary Judgment, supra note 42, at 2254.
164 Bell, supra note 124, at 205.
165 Blair, supra note 122, at 1398; see also Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296,
309-10 (3d Cir. 1999) ("We should not insist that all plaintiffs with bipolar disorder must
have ... self-awareness and expressive powers.., before we allow that their condition is
substantially limiting.").
166 Blair, supra note 122, at 1398.
167 See id.
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impairments. Similarly, an individual may be aware of the condition,
but be in denial about the need for accommodation."'I
It is dear that vague requests for fewer job responsibilities, less
pressure, or reduced stress are insufficient to put an employer on no-
tice that an employee is disabled or requires a specific accommoda-
tion. 169 As the Fifth Circuit stated:
Where the disability, resulting limitations, and necessary reasonable
accommodations, are not open, obvious, and apparent to the em-
ployer, as is often the case when mental disabilities are involved, the
initial burden rests primarily upon the employee, or his health-care
provider, to specifically identify the disability and resulting limita-
tions, and to suggest the reasonable accommodations.' 70
IV
MErAL ILLNESS ADA CLAm s FOLLOWING STro1V
Sutton gives employers significant leeway in establishing qualifica-
tion standards based on mental or physical characteristics.17 1 Since
the statute no longer covers many of the individuals affected by those
standards, fewer courts will need to address whether hiring or promo-
tion criteria meet the ADA's requirement ofjob-relatedness and busi-
ness necessity. 72
Mentally ill individuals whose impairments are controlled, at least
in part, by medication will have to adjust their litigation strategies.
Both litigants and courts will need to closely scrutinize the interaction
between illness and medication. In addition, although many plaintiffs
will undoubtedly resort to the second and third prongs of the ADA
"disability" definition-the "record of' and "regarded as" sections-
this approach carries significant drawbacks. 173 Finally, due to the dif-
ficult evidentiary standard in cases involving the major life activity of
working, many future plaintiffs will need to bring claims based on
other major life activities that have been successful in the wake of
Sutton.
168 Laura F. Rothstein, The Employer!s Duty to Accommodate Performance and Conduct Defi-
ciencies of Individuals with Mental Impairments Under Disabilit
, 
Discrimination Law& 47 Swu-
cusE L REv. 931, 948 (1997) (citation omitted).
169 Avoiding SummaryJudgment supra note 42, at 2255.
170 Taylor v. Principal Fin. Group, 93 F.3d 155, 165 (5th Cir. 1996).
171 See Hungar & Scalia, supra note 88, at 714; Micitel Starr & Jan F. Constantine,
Employer Qualification Tests: Deeper Meaning of Rent Cases in High Court, N.Y LJ., Aug. 23,
1999, at S1.
172 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.10 (2000).
173 See, e.g., infra Part W.B.
20011
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
A. Issues with Medication: Effectiveness and Side Effects
From a plaintiffs perspective, the most significant loophole in
Sutton is the Court's declaration that both the positive and negative
effects of mitigating measures should be considered when assessing an
individual's disabled status. 174 The Court observed, accordingly, that
the "use or nonuse of a corrective device does not determine whether
an individual is disabled.' 7 5 Therefore, if a mentally ill plaintiff uses
medication that is only mildly effective or causes disabling side effects,
he might nonetheless be substantially limited in a major life activity.
Consequently, courts examining plaintiffs using medications
should pose three questions: (1) Is the impairment fully corrected?
(2) If the impairment is not fully corrected, does it still rise to the level
of "substantially limiting"? (3) Regardless of whether the impairment
is fully corrected, do any side effects of the corrective measure sub-
stantially limit a major life activity?
1. Plaintiff Losses: The "Functioning" Individual
At least two courts have rejected mentally ill individuals' claims
after Sutton because their medications and counseling "allow [them]
to function without limitation."'176 In Spades v. City of Walnut Ridge,177
a police officer who had attempted suicide was denied reinstatement
after a leave of absence based on the city's fear that his continued
employment would increase the city's liability.17 8 The Spades court did
not reach the question of whether the city's decision was consistent
with business necessity because the plaintiffs ability to "function"
meant his depression was "corrected" and therefore could not "sub-
stantially limit a major life activity."179
In Robb v. Horizon Credit Union,'8 0 the District Court for the Cen-
tral District of Illinois rejected the plaintiffs claim on similar
grounds.' 8 ' In that case, following a hospitalization for depression
and suicidal tendencies, the plaintiff-employee returned to work.'82
Upon her return, the company president directed a manager to moni-
tor the plaintiffs personal telephone calls.' 8 3 Later, the president
reprimanded the plaintiff for having personal conversations with a co-
174 See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 482 (1999).
175 Id. at 488.
176 Spades v. City of Walnut Ridge, 186 F.3d 897, 900 (8th Cir. 1999) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).
177 186 F.3d 897 (8th Cir. 1999).
178 Id. at 899.
179 Id. at 900.
180 66 F. Supp. 2d 913 (C.D. Ill. 1999).
181 See id. at 918.
182 Id. at 914-15.
183 Id. at 915.
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worker and demanded that plaintiff write a memorandum regarding
the incident, or risk termination.184 Moreover, although the plain-
tiff's supervisor routinely permitted his employees to leave work for
medical appointments-with the understanding that the employee
would make up the time the following day-the president would not
allow the plaintiff to take advantage of this system.'85 Soon thereafter,
the president changed the plaintiff's traditional lunch schedule. 186 Fi-
nally, the president fired the plaintiff without issuing a warning and
despite her supervisor's disagreement.187 The president, stating that
the plaintffs work had been satisfactory, asserted that the termina-
tion was merely based on a "personality conflict."' aa The court re-
jected the plaintiff's claim under the first prong of the disability
definition because she admitted that her drugs "allowed her to func-
tion" and because she had been working without restriction. 89
2. Promising Signs for Plaintiffs
Following Sutton, some courts have begun to emphasize the fac-
tual sensitivities of cases concerning the effects of psychotropic medi-
cations and the need for jury deliberation on this issue. Employees
might be substantially limited entirely as a result of the adverse side
effects of their medications or by a combination of those side effects
and the employee's continuing symptoms. At least one court has read
Sutton's mitigating measures holding narrowly, distinguishing the case
on its facts.' 90 Since Sutton, plaintiffs have been able to create jury
questions on whether the side effects of their psychotropic medica-
184 Id. at 915-16.
185 Id. at 915.
186 Id.
187 Id at 916.
188 Id.
189 Id. at 917-18; see also infra note 307 (identifing cases in whicl limitations in the
ability to sleep were controlled by medications). Although the ROb court properly ex-
amined the plaintiff's condition after taking the medication, the court should only have
assessed the plaintiff's status as of the time of her termination. The court should not have
considered her status when she began a new job more than one year following her termi-
nation. For a discussion of the court's analysis of the plaintiffs "regarded as" claim, see
infra note 239.
190 See FederalJudge.Jury Slwuld Decide Some ADA Cases if Disability Not Fully Confrtoled, PA.
L Wiux., July 26, 1999, at 2; EEOC v. United Airlines, Inc., No. 98-2076, 1999 U.S. App.
LEXIS 25938 (10th Cir.June 17, 1999) (table opinion, full text amailable on LEXIS).
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dons alone "substantially limited" sleeping, 191 interacting with
others, 192 and engaging in sexual relations. 193
Also, the Third Circuit recognized that although a mentally ill
individual's symptoms were partially controlled by medication, the
combination of her remaining symptoms and the medication's ad-
verse side effects could create a triable issue as to whether she was
substantially limited in the major life activity of thinking.9 4 In fact,
the court used evidence of the plaintiffs continued inability to under-
stand the gravity of her illness to support its conclusion that she was
substantially limited in her ability to think.195 Interestingly, the Third
Circuit carefully delineated the "direct" and "indirect" side effects of
the plaintiffs medication. 96 Both nausea (an indirect side effect)
and memory and concentration problems (direct side effects) could
have limited the plaintiff's ability to think.197 Accordingly, the court
noted that the plaintiff "had to contend with a serious, very much
ongoing condition."198
Similarly, some mitigating measures might only be effective inter-
mittently. Whereas a high likelihood of recurrence does not alone
establish a disability, an "intermittent impairment that is a characteris-
tic manifestation of an admitted disability.., falls outside the realm of
temporary, non-chronic impairments." 199 Since mental illness is in-
herently unpredictable and physicians often adjust patients' medica-
191 E.g., McAlindin v. County of San Diego, 192 F.3d 1226, 1235 (9th Cir. 1999); see also
Franklin v. Consol. Edison Co., No. 98 CIV 2286, 1999 WL 796170, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
30, 1999) (holding that epilepsy medication substantially limited plaintiffs ability to sleep).
But see Todd v. Acad. Corp., 57 F. Supp. 2d 448, 452 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (holding that an
epileptic was not substantially limited by the side effects of his medication). Although the
plaintiffs in Franklin and Todd suffered from epilepsy, which is a physical impairment, see
Todd, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 452, the unpredictable nature of that disease and the side effects of
its treatment supply an interesting comparison to mental illness cases.
192 E.g., McAlindin, 192 F.3d at 1234.
193 E.g., id.
194 See Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 308-09 (3d Cir. 1999).
195 Id. at 310.
196 See id. at 30809.
197 Id.
198 Id. at 309.
199 Brown v. N. Trust Bank, No. 95-C-7559, 1997 WL 543098, at *5 (N.D. Ill, Sept. 2,
1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). Since the Sutton decision, the EEOC has sug-
gested that its officers ask whether mitigating measures are effective only intermittently or
"tend to become less effective under certain conditions," such as "great stress," "adverse
weather conditions," "illnesses," or, for women, "monthly hormonal changes," EQUAL ENM.
PLOYMENT OPPORTUNrIY CO, M'N, INSTRUCTIONS FOR FIELD OrFIcEs: ANALYZING ADA
CHARGES AFrER SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ADDRESSING "DISABILTIEs" AND "QUALIFIED" 5
(1999), reprinted in 2 28TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON EMPLOYMENT L4,NW 313, 319 (PLI Lit. &
Admin. Practice Series, Handbook Series No. H-615, 1999) [hereinafter SEPTEMBER 1999
EEOC INSTRUCrIONS]; see alsoJudge David L. Bazelon Ctr. for Mental Health, The Suprnne
Court's 1999 ADA Decisions, at http://www.bazelon.org/sct99ada.html (May 30, 2000) (sug-
gesting that an individual who experiences intermittent periods of substantial limitation
might be disabled).
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tions with mixed success,200 an individual who is only functioning well
on a month-to-month basis might qualify as disabled.
The District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylania has
gone even further, holding that mitigating measures should only bar
suit when they "fully control" an individual's impairment 201 In doing
so, the court distinguished Sutton as a clear-cut case concerning poor
eyesight and common eyeglasses. 20 2
3. Are Employees Obligated to Take Medications?
Does the Court's mitigating measures ruling produce a disincen-
tive to self-help? 203 If so, can an employer require that an employee
take medication for an alleged disability? If the employee refuses,
does she relinquish coverage under the ADA? -v
Some have argued that the mitigating measures ruling creates an
odd result: the disabled individual who strictly follows medical advice
might fall outside the scope of the statute, whereas her "less disci-
plined counterpart" would garner protection.20-- Moreover, one indi-
vidual who can afford certain medications or treatments might not be
covered, yet a less fortunate person with a similar impairment could
qualify as disabled under the statute.20 6
The primary concern, however, is not the fully cured person, who
might utilize the "record of' prong of the disability definition.
Rather, the courts should scrutinize the situation facing the individual
who improves his impairment to the point at which he is no longer
200 See Brief of Amid Curiae Senator Harkin et al. at 10-11, Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirk-
ingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999) (No. 97-1943); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc, 527 U.S.
516 (1999) (No. 97-1992); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999) (No. 98-
591) [hereinafter Harkin Brief] (noting that mental illnesses "fluctuate in severity over
time").
201 See FederalJudge.Juiy Should Decide Some ADA Cases if DisabiliV
" 
Not Fully Cntroled,
supra note 190.
202 See i&; see also 9 LutsoN Er A.., supra note 141, § 153.04(3) (f) (suggesting that one
might circumvent a summaryjudgment ruling under Sutton by arguing that the condition
at issue cannot be controlled with the sort of precision by which eyeglasses control poor
sight).
203 SeeArnold v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 136 F.3d 854,863 n.7 (1st Cir. 1998). Sutton
abrogated Arnold's holding that mitigating measures should not be considered in assessing
disabled status. See Pacella v. Tufts Univ. Sch. of Dental Med., 66 F. Supp. 2d 234, 238 (D.
Mass. 1999).
204 One commentator posed this question following Sulton: "[C]ould an employer re-
quire an employee to take mitigating or corrective measures for a claimed disability.. ? It
does not seem to be a great stretch to bar from ADA coverage employees whose 'disabili-
ties' could be easily corrected, but who do not so." Steinberg, supra note 44, at 5; see also 9
LRSON Er Aj., supra note 141, § 153.04(3) (e) (discussing forced mitigating measures and
asking whether one needs to accept unw-nted treatment, how compelling a reason war-
rants that treatment, and whether the cost of mitigating measures might be a factor).
205 Harkin Brief, supra note 200, at 13.
206 See Arnold, 136 F.3d at 862.
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"substantially limited," but still has difficulty performing at the ex-
pected level. Such a person is not disabled under the first prong and
is therefore not entitled to receive accommodations. He might base a
claim on the "record of' prong, but as explained below,20 7 this route
would not entitle him to the necessary accommodation. He would
remain "not otherwise qualified"20 and thus have a "disincentive to
self-help." 20 9 To combat this potential backlash, courts have consist-
ently held that a disabled employee must do his part: He should not
receive accommodations unless he first takes reasonable steps to im-
prove the impairment himself.2 10
Several interesting scenarios arise if an employee refuses to use
medication because of its harsh side effects. For instance, despite ac-
commodations, the nonmedicated employee might not be able to per-
form the essential functions of the job. In that case, he is clearly not
qualified. Moreover, if the nonmedicated employee can still perform
his job, but only with an accommodation, must the employer grant
the accommodation? Or can the employer insist that the employee
take the medication needed to provide his highest quality labor, re-
gardless of the medication's side effects?2 11
207 See infra Part I.B.1.
208 See Franklin v. U.S. Postal Serv., 687 F. Supp. 1214, 1219 (S.D. Ohio 1988) (con-
cluding in a Rehabilitation Act case that a "person suffering from the condition of para-
noid schizophrenia that is controllable by the ingestion of medication who does not take
such medication is not an 'otherwise qualified handicapped person.'"); cf. Burroughs v,
City of Springfield, 163 F.3d 505, 508.09 (8th Cir. 1998) (using this alternative reasoning In
a diabetes case).
209 Arnold 136 F.3d at 863 n.7.
210 See Mary Crossley, The Disability Kaleidoscope, 74 No-rm DAliE L. Rtv. 621, 653 &
n.167 (1999). In Roberts v. County of Fairfax, 937 F. Supp. 541 (E.D. Va. 1996), a mentally ill
employee's supervisors consistently urged him to seek treatment, and recommended that
he contact the county Employee Assistance Program. Id. at 543. The employee, who never
sought help, claimed that the company "had a legal duty to require him to obtain counsel-
ing." Id. at 548. The court held that the plaintiff was not a qualified individual under the
ADA because he was unwilling to accept a necessary accommodation. Id. Moreover, the
company had no duty to force him to accept such an accommodation, Id. at 547-48; ef.
Harkin Brief, supra note 200, at 13 (expressing concern that if mitigating measures are
considered in evaluating disability status, courts would improperly question whether the
impairment could be controlled).
211 See, e.g., Federal Judge: Jury Should Decide Some ADA Cases if Disability Not lully Con-
trolled, supra note 190.
The article describes a case in which the plaintiff, a doctor with Attention Deficit Dis-
order (ADD), claimed that his employer discriminated against him when his coworkers
learned that he took ADD medication. Id. The plaintiff alleged that although his medica-
tion could fully control his symptoms, he took a lower dosage in order to avoid side effects
that would have affected his surgical abilities. Id. The trial court denied the defendant's
Motion for SummaryJudgment on the disability issue. Id.
If the doctor had taken the full dosage of medication, he would have fully controlled
his ADD, but would have created side effects that would have prevented him from doing
his job. Thus, he might not have been qualified for his position as a surgeon, and moreo-
ver, would not have been substantially limited in a broad class ofjobs. His situation would
constitute a new catch-22.
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B. Using the "Record of" and "Regarded as" Prongs to Attain
Disabled Status
The decision in Sutton can preclude a plaintiff, whose condition is
at least partly controlled, from addressing in court whether she was
the victim of discrimination. However, mentally ill plaintiffs will at-
tempt to circumvent this barrier by using the "record of" and "re-
garded as" prongs of the ADA's disability definition.2 12 Ultimately,
however, even if mentally ill plaintiffs can satisfy the difficult eviden-
tiary burdens of the prevailing statutory interpretation, the limited
remedies available will likely disappoint them.
1. Having a "Record of" a Disability
In September 1999, the EEOC issued a series of Instructions for
Field Officers in response to the Court's declarations concerning cor-
rective measures.213 The Commission recognized the newfound im-
portance of the "record of" prong,214 suggesting that investigators
take it into consideration in all mitigating measures cases. In essence,
the Commission's instructions anticipate that a claimant with a severe
but controlled condition will have at some point experienced the con-
dition's debilitating effects. 2 15
If the employer were aware of this history, a claimant could argue
that, regardless of his or her current status, the employer based its
actions on the formerly untreated ailment 2 16 An employee ith a
"controlled" mental illness might argue that the employer acted on
the belief that the claimant was likely to relapse, was unreliable, or
posed an insurance risk.217 A court would first have to determine that
the plaintiff was, at one time, substantially limited. For instance, a
claimant who returned to work after a hospitalization for mental ill-
212 See The Supreme Court-Leading Cases, 113 HIw. L RE%. 200, 34445 (1899) [herein-
after Leading Cases] (predicting fewer viable first-prong claims and therefore increased sec-
ond- and third-prong claims).
213 See Sm'mBEmR 1999 EEOC INSmucIrroNs, supra note 199.
214 In the past, plaintiffs have rarely invoked the "record of" prong. Eichhorn, supra
note 50, at 1461 (stating that "record of" cases are the least frequently asserted).
215 See SEPTmrBER 1999 EEOC INsTRucnoS, supra note 199, at 10-12; Shannon P.
Duffy, U.S. Supreme Court's ADA Rulings Shake Plaintiffs'Empl-iment Bar, 220 L-a-%.. ,,-r.t-
GENcER, June 24, 1999, at 1, 10 (Plaintiffs' attorney Lisa M. Rau states: "I do think we can
save a lot of these cases by going immediately to the second prong.... Most people who
have mitigating measures will have a history that you can point to."); see also Brief of Ami-
cus Curiae AFL-CIO at 20 n.7, Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999) (No.
97-1943) (arguing that Arline indicates that "record of" claims are not limited to past, fully
cured impairments).
216 See Brief of Amicus Curiae AFL-CIO, supra note 215, at 17-18 & n.6 (encouraging
increased use of the "record of" prong in the realm of controlled impairments).
217 See id. at 20 (noting that in mental illness cases, as in Arline, employers are con-
cerned that the condition might become active or that medications might not work).
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ness might succeed under the "record of" prong.218 If the employer
bases current employment decisions on the individual's medical his-
tory, the employer has, in essence, trapped the employee in the past,
rendering ineffective the workplace benefits of his current
medication.
2. Being "Regarded as" Having a Disability
As one commentator noted, the "regarded as" prong "is intended
to take the attention away from the actual physical or mental limita-
tions of the individual and to focus instead on an examination of the
employer's policies. '219
Thus, mentally ill plaintiffs who are precluded from asserting an
actual disability due to the effectiveness of their medication will likely
refer to the Arline Court's disdain for "the accumulated myths and
fears" confronting disabled individuals220 and argue that the employer
acted upon stereotypical attitudes about the mentally ill. Under the
prevailing judicial interpretation of the "regarded as" prong, however,
this is no easy task.221 An employer will not be assessed liability under
the "regarded as" prong for maintaining general fears or misconcep-
tions about the mentally ill or even for the disparate treatment of a
mentally ill plaintiff. Rather, the plaintiff must present evidence that
the employer incorrectly believed that she was substantially limited in
a major life activity.222 Plaintiffs are rarely successful under the diffi-
cult standard of this prong.223
218 See Sch. Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 281 (1987), superseded by
statute as stated in Fedro v. Reno, 21 F.3d 1391 (7th Cir. 1994) (recognizing that hospitaliza-
tion was "a fact more than sufficient to establish that one or more of [Arline's] major life
activities were substantially limited by her impairment"). But see Glidden v. County of
Monroe, 950 F. Supp. 73, 76 (W.D.N.Y. 1997) (stating that a five-day hospital stay for
mental illness, without suggestion that the impairment at that time was substantially limit-
ing, was not enough for record of disability).
One might also argue that a medically required leave of absence from work indicates a
.record of" a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working. Nonetheless, hos-
pitalization is certainly a better candidate for a per se rule than a leave of absence situation.
For a discussion of Arline and its influence on the drafting of the ADA, see supra Part I.B.1,
219 Mayerson, supra note 27, at 588-89; see also Burgdorf, supra note 4, at 435 (noting
that the "regarded as" prong "focuses on the existence of discrimination, not upon die
characteristics of the person upon whom discrimination is visited"); Definition of the Ten
"Disability, "130 EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) § 902.8(a) (1995) (stating that "this part of the
definition is directed at the employer rather than at the individual alleging
discrimination").
220 Arline, 480 U.S. at 284.
221 See Burgdorf, supra note 4, at 571-72; Eichhom, supra note 50, at 1462-63; Leading
Cases, supra note 212, at 347.
222 See Bales, supra note 47, at 232-33; Burgdorf, supra note 4, at 571-72; Eichhorn,
supra note 50, at 1462-63.
223 See Locke, supra note 138, at 141 & n.159.
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a. Success with "Regarded as"
Nonetheless, some courts have held that "regarded as" plaintiffs
warrant ADA protection.224 Many ADA pundits emphasize the paral-
lels between the plight of "regarded as" disabled individuals and that
of victims of race or gender discrimination. As Judge Posner
explained:
[The "regarded as" prong] actually makes a better fit with the elabo-
rate preamble to the Act, in which people who have physical or
mental impairments are compared to victims of racial and other in-
vidious discrimination. Many such impairments are not in fact disa-
bling but are believed to be so, and the people having them may be
denied employment or othenvise shunned as a consequence. Such
people, objectively capable of performing as well as the unimpauired,
are analogous to capable workers discriminated against because of
their skin color or some other vocationally irrelevant
characteristic.2 25
With this in mind, courts should "carefully scrutinize" the employer's
reasons for taking an adverse employment action.2 6 The EEOC, for
example, suggests that workers' compensation and medical files may
contain evidence of generalized fears or stereotypes concerning a
mentally ill employee.22 7
Holihan v. Lucky Stores, Inc.22 8 is one of the few mental illness cases
in which the employee's "regarded as" claim survived summary judg-
ment. 2 29 In that case, a supermarket manager had acted abusively to-
wards other employees, took a company-mandated leave of absence,
and was diagnosed with depression and anxiety.2- 0 The court ob-
served that a manager had asked the plaintiff if he was having
"problems," that the company had encouraged him to seek help from
its Employee Assistance Program, and that the company had received
doctors' reports in connection with a workers' compensation claim
and the leave of absence diagnosing the employee with depression,
anxiety, and stress.231 Based on this evidence, the court asserted that
a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the employer regarded
Holihan as substantially limited in his ability to work.2
224 E.g., Holihan v. Lucky Stores, 87 F.3d 362 (9th Cir. 1996).
225 Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 541 (7th Cir. 1995).
226 See SEmPiEBER 1999 EEOC INsraucnoNs, supra note 199.
227 Id.
228 87 F.3d 362 (9th Cir. 1996).
229 Id. at 366-67.
230 Id- at 364-65.
231 I. at 366.
232 Id.; see also Stradley v. LaFourche Communications, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 442, 444
(E.D. La. 1994) (criticizing an employer for interpreting an employee's illness in "layman's
terms" and ruling that a jury could conclude that this interpretation evidenced a belief
"that Stradley was not fit to work in anyjob"). But see Risa M. Mish, "Regardd As Disabrd'
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The "regarded as" prong might be particularly useful to a men-
tally ill employee who returns from a leave of absence and is either
harassed or treated differently than his coworkers. For instance, it is
not uncommon for a supervisor to probe such an employee's work for
mistakes and to record errors with unusual formality.233
b. Problems with "Regarded as"
Based on the legislative history of the Act, the EEOC stated:
[I]f an individual can show that an employer.., made an employ-
ment decision because of a perception of a disability based on 'myth,
fear or stereotype,' the individual will satisfy the 'regarded as' part
of the definition of disability. If the employer cannot articulate a
non-discriminatory reason for the employment action, an inference
that the employer is acting on the basis of "myth, fear or stereotype"
can be drawn. 234
Read in tandem with the language of the statute, this statement dic-
tates that a plaintiff must prove that her employer perceived that she
suffered from an impairment that substantially limited a major life
activity.23 5 That is, we must assume the word "disability" in the EEOC
directive is tantamount to an ADA-defined disability.23 6
This standard of proof is particularly difficult because the major-
ity of "regarded as" plaintiffs assert that their employers regarded
them as substantially limited in the major life activity of working.23 7
Thus, in order for a plaintiff to survive summary judgment, courts
generally require proof that the employer based its actions upon a
perception that the employee is barred from a variety ofjobs.23 8 Put
Claims Under the ADA: Safety Net or Catch-Ali1, 1 U. PA.J. LA. & EMP. L. 159, 171-74 (1998)
(criticizing the Holihan decision). Mish argues that a "regarded as" plaintiff must meet
three requirements: (1) the perceived impairment would substantially limit a major life
activity, and not simply prevent the individual from performing a subset of jobs; (2) the
individual can, in fact, perform the essential functions of the job in question; and (3) tie
employer's action gave rise to an inference of discrimination. Id. at 175.
233 E.g., Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 304-06 (3d Cir. 1999) (explain-
ing that upon return from leave, supervisor immediately increased employee's workload,
saved letters with typos, and photographed employee's desk and trash can).
234 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(1) (2000) (emphasis added).
235 Eichhorn, supra note 50, at 1467.
236 In fact, the most definite statement in the legislative history on this point supports
such a reading. The House Report states: "This test is intended to cover persons who are
treated by a covered entity as having a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits a major life activity." H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 29 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 452.
237 See Mayerson, supra note 27, at 598.
238 See Loeckle v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 59 F. Supp. 2d 838, 855 (N.D. Iowa 1999)
(distinguishing Holihan as a case in which "the employer was aware of a condition that
would or could substantially impair the plaintiff's ability to work at anyjob"); see also Locke,
supra note 138, at 145 (arguing that courts should not require plaintiffs to prove that "an
employer erroneously perceived them to be unable to work generally in a type of employ-
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another way, evidence that the employer displayed hostility touwards
the plaintiff because of his condition, or even evidence that this hostil-
ity prompted termination, might not be sufficient to create an issue of
fact under the "regarded as" prong.2 9
Many courts have also observed that evidence of an employer
voicing concerns about an employee's mental health is, without more,
insufficient to prove that the employer regarded the individual as dis-
abled.240 Courts have reached the same conclusion when an em-
ployer requests that the individual see a psychologist - 41 or when it
offers a leave of absence. 242 In fact, some courts have looked to an
employer's request that an employee receive a psychological evalua-
tion as strong evidence that the employer did not regard an employee
as mentally disabled; these evaluations are "reasonable means to ascer-
tain the cause of troubling behavior."243 Courts have also typically not
held an employer accountable merely by evidence that it had previ-
ously extended accommodations to an employee.2"4  By punishing
these actions, courts would discourage flexibility among managers
who informally grant privileges that increase workforce morale.2 45
ment"); Mayerson, supra note 27, at 599 (noting further that "[a] plaintiff can produce
evidence of how he or she was treated, not what the employer 'perceives'").
239 See Robb v. Horizon Credit Union, 66 F. Supp. 2d 913, 919 (C.D. II. 1999) (sug-
gesting also that an employer that regards an employee as suffering from a substantially
limiting impairment will not be liable unless it also regards that impairment as
permanent).
240 Eg., Cody v. Cigna Healthcare, 139 F.3d 595, 599 (8th Cir. 1998) (noting employ-
ers' right to "ascertain the cause of troubling behavior ithout exposing themselves to ADA
claims").
241 Eg., Pouncy v. Vulcan Materials Co., 920 F. Supp. 1566, 1580-81 (N.D. Ala. 1996).
242 K-g., Sullivan v. River Valley Sch. Dist., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (W.D. Mich. 1998);
Kocsis v. Multi-Care Mgmt. Inc., 1996 FED App. 330P (6th Cir.), 97 F.3d 876, 885. But see
Derbis v. U.S. Shoe Corp., Civ. A. No. MJG-93-130, 1994 AM 631155, *5 (D. Md. Sept. 7,
1994) (declaring that employer's alleged suggestion that plaintiff apply for long-term disa-
bility leave raised an issue of fact as to whether employer regarded plaintiff as unemplo)a-
ble), aff'd, 67 F.3d 294 (4th Cir. 1995) (unpublished table decision).
243 Sullivan, 20 F. Supp. 2d at 1125 (quoting Cody, 139 F.3d at 599). The Sullian court
also noted that, even assuming that the employer regarded the plaintiff as disabled, the
requested psychological evaluation was nondiscriminatory, that is, job-related and consis-
tent with business necessity. Id. at 1126-27; see also Hawkins v. Microfibres, Inc., No.
1:94CV86-S-D, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21611, at *13-14 (N.D. Miss. 1995) (stating that an
employer's referral of an employee to Employee Assistance Program should not necessarily
give rise to a "regarded as" cause of action).
244 Eg., Taylor v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 177 F.Sd 180, 189-90 (3d Cir. 1999).
245 Eg., Kvintus v. R.L Polk & Co., 3 F. Supp. 2d 788, 795 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (ac-
cepting that an offer of "time off" did not display discriminatory animus and that "there is
nothing improper or illegal about offering a plaintiff an 'accommodation'"). Some courts
have even suggested that an employer's refusal to accommodate might support its defense
that it did not regard an employee as disabled. Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., No. 96-7174
(3d Cir. Aug. 25, 1997), remanded, 142 F.3d 138 (3d Cir. 1998) (en banc); seeJohn M.
Vande Walle, Note, In the Eye of the Bdwlder Issues of Distributihe and Correthe Justie in the
ADA's Employment Protedion for Persons Regarded as Disabled, 73 CHi.Krx¢r L RE%,. 897, 920
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3. Reasonable Accommodations for "Record of' and "Regarded as"
Plaintiffs
Many of the plaintiffs who will now bring "regarded as" or "re-
cord of' claims will seek the reasonable accommodations that, prior to
Sutton, they might have been afforded under the first prong of the
disability definition. The circuits are apparently split concerning the
availability of accommodations for "regarded as" plaintiffs. 246 As a
practical matter, however, it makes little sense to offer this remedy to
anyone who is not "actually disabled."247 Although the following dis-
cussion focuses on the "regarded as" prong, the analysis applies
equally to the issue of accommodating individuals under the "record
of' prong.
a. Support for Accommodating "Regarded as" Plaintiffs
According to its plain meaning, the ADA provides for accommo-
dations for "regarded as" individuals. The statute forbids "not making
reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limita-
tions of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability."248 Because
an individual who is "regarded as" having or has a "record of' a sub-
stantially limiting impairment is an individual with a disability,' 1 the
statute seems to demand reasonable accommodations for that individ-
ual's current limitations.250
From this premise, some plaintiffs have argued that a "failure to
mandate reasonable accommodations for 'regarded as' plaintiffs
would undermine the role the ADA plays in ferreting out disability
discrimination in employment."251 That is, merely reprimanding the
employer for its misperception will not effectively eliminate the "so-
cially constructed and reinforced" stereotypes. 25 2
(1998) ("In some circumstances, the employer's refusal to provide accommodation can
serve as evidence that the employer did not perceive that the plaintiff was disabled.").
246 CompareKatz v. City Metal Co., 87 F.3d 26,33 (1st Cir. 1996) ("[Bloth the language
and policy of the statute seem to us to offer protection as well to one who is not substan-
tially disabled or even disabled at all but is wrongly perceived to be so."), with Weber v.
Strippit, Inc., 186 F.3d 907, 917 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that "'regarded as' disabled plain-
tiffs are not entitled to reasonable accommodations").
247 Although this issue is by no means limited to mental illness cases, because of the
prevalence of those claims and the distinct modes of accommodation related thereto, I
believe it is important to address the issue in this paper.
248 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b) (5) (A) (1994).
249 Id. § 12102(2).
250 In Deane v. Pocono Medical Center, 142 F.3d 138, 148 (3d Cir. 1998) (en banc), the
court raised this issue but refused to decide it.
251 Id. at 148 n.12.
252 Id. at 148-49 n.12.
960 [Vol. 86:927
2001] MENTAL ILLNESS iN THlE WORKPLACE
The First Circuit, in Katz v. City Metal Co.,253 apparently held that
"regarded as" plaintiffs are entitled to accommodations. 2 4 In the
most relevant section, the court stated:
Congress, when it provided for perception to be the basis of disabil-
ity status, probably had principally in mind the more usual case in
which a plaintiff has a long-term medical condition of some kind,
and the employer exaggerates its significance by failing to make a
reasonable accommodation. But both the language and policy of
the statute seem to us to offer protection as well to one who is not
substantially disabled or even disabled at all but is 'wrongly per-
ceived to be so.
25 5
The First Circuit left to the jury the question of whether Katz would
have been able to perform his job if his employer had granted his
request for accommodation. 25 6
The Katz court has been criticized for its characterization of the
"usual case" Congress anticipated.2 57 Its reading of congressional in-
tent, however, would provide exactly what mentally impaired employ-
ees are looking for-the notion that a mentally ill individual might
not be so limited if she was accepted and accommodated by her em-
ployer. One commentator who supports this reading of the statute
stated that "where an individual is being denied an employment op-
portunity because of an erroneous perception, the ADA should re-
quire the employer to consider whether a reasonable accommodation
could remove that barrier to employment."-" s
253 87 F.3d 26 (1st Cir. 1996).
254 Id. at 33.
255 Id.
256 Id. at 34; seeWeberv. Strippit, Inc., 186 F.3d 907, 916-17 (8th Cir. 1999) (discussing
Katz); Michael D. Moberly, Letting Katz Out of the Bag: The Employers Duty to Accommodate
Perceived Disabilities, 30 Aiz. ST. L.J. 603, 614 (1998) (stating that Katz intimated that "re-
garded as" plaintiffs are entitled to accommodations). Compare Mlhr,; 186 Fd at 917
(holding that "'regarded as' disabled plaintifs are not entitled to reasonable accommoda-
tions"), with Spath v. Berry Plastics Corp., 900 F. Supp. 893 (N.D. Ohio 1995) (stating that a
.regarded as" plaintiff should be accommodated).
257 See Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., No. 96-7174, slip op. at 25 (3d Cir. Aug. 25, 1997)
(noting that the employer's failure to accommodate "becomes relevant... only after the
individual is found to be disabled"), remande, 142 F.3d 138 (3d Cir. 1998) (en banc).
258 Moberly, supra note 256, at 637-38 (reasoning that the goal of the ADA "is to re-
move barriers that prevent protected class members from enjo)ing the same employment
opportunities as other persons" (citation omitted)); see also Stradley v. LaFourche Commu-
nications, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 442, 444 (E.D. Ia. 1994) (noting, in a "regarded as" case, that
although plaintiffwas unable to work without accommodation at the time of termination, a
factual issue remained as to whether plaintiff could perform essential functions of his job
with an accommodation).
A policy argument can also be made in favor of accommodating "regarded as" plain-
tiffs. The specter of having to accommodate perceived disabilities ill increase the likeli-
hood that truly disabled individuals are accommodated without resort to litigation. One
author discussed the "regarded as" prong in terms of its "prophylactic justification" be-
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b. Denying Accommodations to "Regarded as" Plaintiffs
It is important to recognize the parallels between the protections
of the ADA "regarded as" prong and those of other federal civil rights
laws. Title VII does not, however, provide accommodations for victims
of race or gender discrimination because the statute presumes that
such individuals can perform the jobs and only need to be rescued
from the stereotypical or bigoted attitudes that block their en-
trance.25 9 Similarly, the ADA should not accommodate those who are
"regarded as" disabled.
The ADA, like Title VII, provides that once the statute removes
the societal barriers to employment, "regarded as" disabled individu-
als can operate as well as anyone else.260 It would be antithetical to
allow the "regarded as" plaintiff to assert that she is not substantially
limited in any major life activity and then to request the accommoda-
tion provided for those who are so limited.
The Third Circuit described the "regarded as" plaintiff as statuto-
rily disabled-disabled not by his impairment, but by fears and mis-
perceptions.261 "To compensate for a statutory disability, then, the
employer need only be dispossessed of its misperception as it is that
which renders the employee disabled."262 To the contrary, those who
are substantially limited receive accommodations for the impairment
"which actually renders ... [the person] disabled."263
Along these lines, however, the disparity between Justice
O'Connor's reading of the third prong in Sutton264 and that of the
EEOC 265 raises questions. Justice O'Connor stated that "[t]here are
two apparent ways in which individuals may fall within this statutory
definition"-if the individual has no impairment but is regarded as
disabled, or if the individual's impairment is not substantially limiting
but is perceived to be so by the employer.2 66 This interpretation ig-
nores the third construction offered by the EEOC, which it culled
cause it prevents "spillover discrimination." SeeVande Walle, supra note 245, at 933. Thus,
the "regarded as" prong could act as a deterrent.
259 See Deane, No. 96-7174, slip op. at 23.
260 See id.
261 See Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 142 F.3d 138, 144-45 (3d Cir. 1998) (en bane),
262 Id.; see also Allen Dudley, Comment, Rights to Reasonable Accommodation Under the
Americans with Disabilities Act for "Regarded as" Disabled Individuals, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV.
389, 412 (1999) (stating that "the only reasonable accommodation that Congress envi-
sioned was tolerance").
263 Deane, No. 96-7174, slip op. at 22.
264 See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 488 (1999).
265 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l) (2000).
266 Sutton, 527 U.S. at 489.
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from the legislative history,267 and the Court's own statements in Ar-
line.26 8 That is, one might be substantially limited "only as a result of
the attitudes of others toward [the] impairment."269
If one recognizes this construction, the argument in favor of ac-
commodation gains practical support. If an individual is unable to
perform the essential functions of her job because her coworkers or
customers entertain antiquated fears or preconceptions relating to
her impairment, she might be substantially limited in a major life ac-
tivity. Presumably, the Supreme Court considered this when it stated:
"Congress acknowledged that society's accumulated myths and fears
about disability and diseases are as handicapping as are the physical
limitations that flow from actual impairment."2 70 Thus, because a case
of "collective discriminatory perceptions" 7 1 seems closer to an actual
disability, a court might be more apt to accommodate the individual,
especially if the limitation arises out of workplace perceptions of the
individual by coworkers or customers.2 7 2
Although the Supreme Court has not explicitly addressed this is-
sue, one might argue that the decision in Arline tacitly endorsed ac-
commodating at least some perceived disabilities. Arline's case came
before the Court after the Court of Appeals found Arline disabled
under the statute. 273 The Eleventh Circuit had remanded for a find-
ing of whether Arline was "otherwise qualified," and if not, whether
the employer could reasonably accommodate her.2 7" By ,affirming the
lower court, the Supreme Court arguably endorsed reasonable accom-
modations for "record of' and "regarded as" plaintiffs. 275 Nonethe-
267 See S. REP. No. 101-116, at 23 (1989) (listing three alternative constructions of the
"regarded as" prong); H.R REP. No. 101485, pt. 3, at 29 (1990), niplinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 452 (same).
268 See Sch. Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 283 (1987) (noting that even
though an impairment might not affect a person's abilities, it could "substantially limit that
person's ability to work as a result of the negative reactions of others to the impairment").
269 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(1)(2). Some commentators have noted that "[t]hIS interpreta-
tion does not coincide with the literal language of the statute, which requires that one be
regarded as having an impairment, that, in itself, substantially limits a major life activity."
Eichhorn, supra note 50, at 1433 (asserting, however, that the regulation is consistent with
the legislative intent).
270 Arine, 480 U.S. at 489.
271 Leading Cases, supra note 212, at 348 (stating that such claims should fall under the
third prong rather than the first prong, but expressing concern that employers might be
punished for perceptions that are not their own).
272 See Moberly, supra note 256, at 620-22. Of course, the method of accommodation
in this area poses difficult questions. If discriminatory misperceptions abound-for in-
stance, if coworkers refuse to cooperate with a mentally ill employee--the accommodation
would need to break down those misperceptions rather than fuel them. This would cer-
tainly present a significant challenge to the employer.
273 Ar/ine 480 U.S. at 277.
274 Id
275 See id.
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less, even if courts recognized the possibility of accommodating this
type of perceived disability, a plaintiff's chances of success would be
slim. As one commentator explained, the prejudice might need to be
so widespread "as to make the individual unemployable. '2 76
The Eighth Circuit is the only Court of Appeals to reject accom-
modations for "regarded as" plaintiffs.277 In Weber v. Strippit,27s the
plaintiff claimed that his employer discriminated against him by fail-
ing to provide a reasonable accommodation for his perceived disabil-
ity.2 7 9 In response, the court stated that although "[t]he reasonable
accommodation requirement is easily applied in a case of an actual
disability," the "requirement makes considerably less sense in the per-
ceived disability context" and "would lead to bizarre results. '280 The
court wrote:
[The Act] cannot reasonably have been intended to create a dispar-
ity in treatment among impaired but non-disabled employees, deny-
ing most the right to reasonable accommodations but granting to
others, because of their employers' misperceptions, a right to rea-
sonable accommodations no more limited than those afforded actu-
ally disabled employees. 28'
4. The Future for "Record of' and "Regarded as" Claims
Assuming that "regarded as" or "record of' plaintiffs cannot ob-
tain accommodations, the courts are left with significant questions
276 Mayerson, supra note 27, at 597. Scholars who discuss the notion of one being
substantially limited as a result of the attitudes of others often refer to the plight of burn
victims or individuals with severe facial scars. These people might be rejected from their
jobs because of a fear of adverse customer reactions. E.g., H.R. REp. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at
30 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 453 (noting that burn victims may be cov-
ered "because of the attitudes of others.., even if [fire victims] did not view themselves as
'impaired'"). It is less likely, however, that an employer would entertain the same fears
concerning a "hidden" impairment like mental illness.
277 See Weber v. Strippit, Inc., 186 F.3d 907, 917 (8th Cir. 1999). The Third Circuit's
decision in Deane v. Pocono Medical Center, No. 96-7174 (3d Cir. Aug. 25, 1997), is not bind.
ing law because, on rehearing, the en banc court did not reach the issue of accommoda-
tions, 142 F.3d 138, 148-49 n.12 (3d Cir. 1998) (en banc). Thus, the potential circuit split
on the issue lies between the Eighth and First Circuits. For additional support for the
Weber holding, see id. at 148 (noting, however, the significance and difficulty of the issue,
and that the employer's argument against accommodations had "considerable force"); see
also Matlock v. City of Dallas, Civ. A. No. 3:97-CV-2735-D, 1999 WL 1032601 (N.D. Tex.
Nov. 12, 1999) (holding "regarded as" plaintiff is precluded from reasonable accommoda-
tion claim); Balliett v. Heydt, Civ. A. No. 95-5184, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14913, at *17-*19
(E.D. Pa. Sept. 25, 1997) (finding plaintiff not "regarded as" mentally disabled and stating
that even if plaintiff were "regarded as" disabled, he did not present evidence that he could
perform the essential functions of the position without accommodation); Cannizzaro v.
Neiman Marcus, Inc., 979 F. Supp. 465, 475 (N.D. Tex. 1997) (same).
278 Weber v. Strippit, Inc., 186 F.3d 917 (8th Cir. 1999).
279 See id. at 915.
280 Id. at 916.
281 Id. at 917.
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concerning appropriate remedies. Imagine a typical situation: an em-
ployer terminates a depressed employee for poor performance. Be-
cause her medication partially controls her symptoms, she is not
substantially limited in any major life activity. Due to remarks by her
superior and other evidence, however, the court determines that the
individual was "regarded as" disabled by the employer. The court or-
ders reinstatement and back wages, but does not require the employer
to accommodate the employee in any way. The employee returns to
work, continues to have problems, and is terminated once again.
Ultimately, the employer gets what it initially wanted-the dismis-
sal of a "problem employee"-but only after losing in court. Yet, the
employee "suffers the very fate she was suing to avoid.., but does so
only after winning her case." 282 This time, the employee cannot bring
an ADA claim: the first case determined that she is not disabled, and
the employer, after losing in that case, certainly does not regard her as
disabled according to the ADA definition.
Some have argued, nevertheless, that the "mischief" of the statute
has been cured through back pay and reinstatement.28 3 However, re-
instatement, which only comes after tremendous litigation costs,
might make matters worse. Courts should recognize this conundrum
and explore other avenues of relief. One solution might be an award
of "front pay." This would give the plaintiff an opportunity to seek
alternative employment and eliminates the possibility of future entan-
glements between the parties.28 4 Plus, the employer is now amare of
the myths and stereotypes of the illness. Hopefully, in the future, the
employer will make minor accommodations to avoid litigation. 28s
In conclusion, however, a word of caution: the "regarded as"
prong might become obsolete for the mentally ill plaintiff. In Sttton,
the Supreme Court expressed serious doubts as to whether "working"
should be included among the major life activities covered by the
ADA 28 6 The Court, though, did not decide the issue because it was
282 Deane, No. 96-7174, slip op. at 41 (Becker, J., dissenting) (discussing a similar
scenario).
283 See id. (Becker, J., dissenting).
284 See Farley v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 197 F.3d 1322, 133840 (11thl Cir. 1999) (uphold-
ing trial court's a ard of front pay in lieu of reinstatement in "special circumstances" vwhen
reinstatement is "not feasible" due to hostility in the workplace); se also Paul C. Weiler,
Promises to Keep: Securing Workers'Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96 R%a L R%.s
1769, 1787-95 (1983) (discussing problems with reinstatement and back pay in the union
setting and noting that among reinstated employees, "nearly 80% were gone within a year
or two").
285 See Deane, No. 96-7174, slip op. at 42 (BeckerJ., dissenting).
286 See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 492 (1999) (noting that "there
may be some conceptual difficulty in defining 'major life activities' to include work"); cf.
EEOC Guidances Under Scrutiny, ADA UPDATE (NYPER Publications, Latham, N.Y.), Aug.
1999, at 30 (stating that in light of Sutton, "[a]ll EEOC definitions are now questionable"
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
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not raised.287 Therefore, since most perceived disability claims by
mentally ill individuals concern the major life activity of working,
plaintiffs might become even more limited in the future.2"8
C. Major Life Activities (Other than Working)
Although the Sutton Court did not eviscerate the major life activ-
ity of working, its guarded analysis of that issue289 should curtail its
already diminished effectiveness in the lower courts. Thus, mentally
ill plaintiffs will likely begin to emphasize other major life activities. -90
For instance, as noted above, in conjunction with evidence regarding
the effects of their medications, plaintiffs have already begun to ex-
plore problems with sleeping, thinking, and interacting with others. '91
In McAlindin v. County of San Diego2 92 the Ninth Circuit held that
sleeping, engaging in sexual relations, and interacting with others are
major life activities,29 3 providing plaintiffs with the most promising
mental illness ruling since Sutton. Although McAlindin apparently did
not specifically raise the "interacting with others" issue,2 94 the majority
declared that "[b] ecause [it] ... is an essential, regular function, like
walking and breathing, it easily falls within the definition of 'major life
activity."'29 5 The court qualified its holding, however, and maintained
that "[riecognizing interacting with others as a major life activity of
course does not mean that any cantankerous person will be deemed
substantially limited."2 96 In sum, the court wrote, "a plaintiff must
show that his 'relations with others were characterized on a regular
basis by severe problems, for example, consistently high levels of hos-
tility, social withdrawal, or failure to communicate when
necessary."'2 9 7
Thus, under the majority's strict definition, only plaintiffs with
very serious interpersonal limitations could proceed beyond summary
judgment. It is unlikely, however, that "interacting with others," as
287 Sutton, 527 U.S. at 492.
288 See Starr & Constantine, supra note 171, at 512.
289 See supra Part II.A.
290 Cf Blair, supra note 122, at 1400-01 (suggesting this prior to die Sulton decision),
291 For an extensive list of possible limitations in major life activities for mentally ill
individuals, see Judge David L. Bazelon Center for Mental Health, List of Limiltations on
Major Life Activities, at http://www.bazelon.org/lmtslist.html (Aug. 11, 1999) and Boston
University Research Center for Psychiatric Rehabilitation, How Does Mental Illness Affect the
Way I Function at Worki, at http://www.bu.edu/sarpsych/obschool/functemp.htm (last vis-
ited Feb. 28, 2001).
292 192 F.3d 1226 (9th Cir. 1999).
293 Id. at 1233.
294 See id. at 1240 (Trott, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
295 Id. at 1234.
296 Id. at 1235.
297 Id. at 1234 (quoting EEOC Psychiatric Guidance, supra note 35, at 2334).
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such, will make great inroads,298 for it automatically raises the catch-
22 of disability and qualification.
The McAlindin court's recognition of sexual functioning as a ma-
jor life activity is also groundbreaking. If the plaintiff was substantially
limited in his ability to function sexually-even if caused entirely by
psychotropic medications-then his panic disorder would rise to the
level of a disability. However, unlike the plaintiff in Taylor v. Phoenix-
ville School District,299 whose medication-induced nausea indirectly af-
fected her ability to think,300 this plaintiff's ability to function sexually
was unrelated to his work performance.301
Finally, the Ninth Circuit's recognition of sleeping as a major life
activity might assist future mentally ill plaintiffs. Other courts, how-
ever, have been more restrictive in this area. For example, in Kvintus
v. RL. Polk & Co.,3 0 2 the plaintiff suffered from post-Vietnam stress
disorder and claimed that his disorder caused a "lack of sleep."303
Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that he had slept less than four
hours a night for more than thirty years.304 Interestingly, the court,
and presumably the plaintiff, did not phrase the major life activity in
terms of "sleeping" alone, which is recognized in EEOC Psychiatric Gui-
dance,305 Instead, the court observed that the "plaintiff... [has not]
298 In general, courts have read claims concerning "interacting uith others' very nar-
rowly. See, e-g., Doyal v. Okla. Heart, Inc., 213 F.3d 492, 499 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding that
plaintiff presented insufficient evidence); Soileau v. Guilford of Me., Inc., 105 F.3d 12, 15
& n.2 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding that EEOC Psychiatric Guidance on "interacting -ith
others" is "hardly binding" and stating in dicta that"(t]he concept... is remarkably elastic,
perhaps so much so as to make it unworkable as a definition"); Weiler v. Household Fin.
Corp., 101 F.3d 519, 527 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding that plaintiff, who was classified ith a
stress disorder, was only unable to work with a particular supervisor); Schneiker v. Fords
Ins. Co., 200 F.3d 1055, 1062 (7th Cir. 2000) (reiterating lllies holding that "a personal-
ity conflict between an employee and a supervisor-even one that triggers the employee's
depression-is not enough to establish that the employee is disabled, so long as the em-
ployee could still perform the job under a different supervisor").
299 184 EMd 296 (3d Cir. 1999) (discussed supra notes 194-98 and accompanying test).
300 IL at 308-09.
301 See McAlindin. 192 F.3d at 1234. The notion of sextal functioning as a major life
activity could raise further issues. First, a court might attempt to distinguish sexual func-
tioning from the major life activity of "reproduction," which the Supreme Court recog-
nized in Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 637-638 (1998). Second, if a court does recognize
a disability based on a substantial limitation in sexual functioning, what sort of reasonable
accommodation would it have to provide? The plain language of the statute could be
interpreted to indicate that once an employee meets the disability threshold, he can re-
quest an accommodation for anyjob-related limitation, whether or not it is a "substantial"
limitation. See42 U.S.C. § 12112(b) (5) (A) (1994). In fact, some experts recommend that
plaintiffi avoid claims based on "major life activities that are strongly related to work per-
formance." Judge David L Bazelon Center for Mental Health, 7e Suprenze Coz's 1999
ADA Dedions, at http://wnv.bazelon.org/sct99ada.hunl (May 30, 2000).
302 3 F. Supp. 2d 788 (E.D. lich. 1998).
303 Id. at 794.
304 Se id
305 EEOC Psychiatric Guidance, supra note 35, at 16.
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demonstrated how his 'lack of sleep' has interfered with plaintiff's abil-
ity to sustain gainful employment.... In short, the Court does not
believe that plaintiff has shown how his 'loss of sleep' equates with
interference with a major life activity."30 6 Perhaps plaintiffs will
achieve more success by asserting limitations in the ability to sleep
apart from work-related limitations.30 7
V
CONCLUSION: AN ALTERNATIVE SCHEME
In Sutton, the Supreme Court curtailed the ability of mentally ill
individuals to proceed beyond summary judgment on ADA employ-
ment claims. As explained in Part IV, mentally ill plaintiffs seeking
accommodations under the first prong of the disability definition will
likely begin to address major life activities other than working. They
will also force courts to examine the side effects of their medications
and any limitations not fully controlled by those medications.
Notwithstanding the Sutton ruling, many plaintiffs will turn to the
second and third prongs of the disability definition. After Sutton, how-
ever, the "regarded as" portion of the statute remains unworkable,
particularly in the realm of mental illness; the case law is extremely
inconsistent and, for the most part, plaintiffs have been unsuccessful
due to the difficult evidentiary burdens brought about by a plain read-
ing of the ADA.308 The remainder of this Note critiques and aug-
ments arguments for reform proposed by other authors and will
ultimately offer an alternative statutory scheme for the ADA employ-
ment provisions. The new language recognizes the practical employer
concerns underlying Sutton,309 but also gives effect to the ADA's man-
tra that individuals who can "do the job" should be unimpeded by
societal misperceptions. In doing so, this Note attempts to provide
better guidance for the courts and a more predictable system for men-
tally ill plaintiffs and their employers.31 0
306 Kvintus, 3 F. Supp. 2d at 795 (emphasis added); see EEOCPsychiatric Guidance, supra
note 35.
307 But see Doyal v. Okla. Heart, Inc., 213 F.3d 492, 498 (10th Cir. 2000) (noting that
excessive sleepiness due to side effects of medication did not establish substantial limita-
tion in ability to sleep); Tedeschi v. Sysco Foods, Inc., No. Civ. A. 99-3170, 2000 WL
1281266, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 1, 2000) (holding that medication controlled sleep
problems).
308 See Eichhorn, supra note 50, at 1433 & n.168 (stating that "the convoluted statutory
language does little to inform potential litigants" and courts about the coverage under the
"regarded as" prong).
309 For example, the Sutton Court indicated that employers should have the freedom
to establish job criteria based on medical conditions. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,
527 U.S. 471, 490-91 (1999).
310 Of course, this new statutory language would prove useful for courts and plaintiffs
in all ADA cases. See supra notes 3-8 and accompanying text.
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A. The Source of the Problem
Professor Robert Burgdor l ' explained that Congress encoun-
tered a problem when it tried to apply a single definition to the non-
discrimination edict of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and to
the affirmative action requirements under Sections 501 and 503.312
He contends that the first prong of the Rehabilitation Act definition
was written in "restrictive" terms, so as to ensure that government con-
tractors could not receive credit for employing moderately impaired
individuals.313 Nevertheless, Congress reapplied this restrictive defini-
tion to the third prong of the ADA definition, "which [is) expansive in
scope" and aimed to cure a broad array of discriminatory attitudes. 314
Thus, courts have often created "illogical and insurmountable"
burdens of proof for "regarded as" plaintiffs31 -- demanding evidence
that an employer regarded an individual as suffering from an impair-
ment that substantially limits a major life activity.316 This burden has
proven particularly troublesome for mentally ill plaintiffs who most
often utilize the major life activity of working and therefore must
prove their employer regarded them as unable to perform a broad
class ofjobs.31 7
B. Legislative Intent Behind the "Regarded as" Prong
With the "regarded as" prong of the disability definition, Con-
gress intended to protect individuals who are denied employment op-
portunities "because of the myths, fears and stereotypes associated
with disabilities."318 The legislative history gives examples of these
common "attitudinal barriers," including "concerns regarding pro-
ductivity, safety, insurance, liability, attendance, cost of accommoda-
tion and accessibility, and acceptance by coworkers and customers."319
Finally, the legislative history suggests that one does not need to prove
311 Professor Burgdorf drafted the original ADA bill introduced to Congress in 1988.
Burgdorf, supra note 4, at 409 n.*.
312 Id. at 528; see generally supra notes 22-25 and accompan)ing teXt.
313 See Burgdorf, supra note 4, at 528; see also Michelle T. Friedland, Note, Not Disabled
Enough. The ADA s "Major Life Activity" Definition of Disabiliy, 52 STA.-4. L RE%% 171, 184-85
(1999) (discussing Burgdorf's theories).
314 See Burgdorf, supra note 4, at 432.
315 See Harkin Brief, supra note 200, at 17.
316 See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 491 (1999); see also Eichhorn,
supra note 50, at 1432-33 (noting that a "regarded as" plaintiff must show a physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits a major life acti ity).
317 See Bales, supra note 47, at 232-33.
318 See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 30-31 (1990), riprintcd in 1990 U.S.C.CA.N. 445,
452-53.
319 Id. at 30, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 453.
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an employer "articulate[d] one of these concerns" in order to gain
coverage under the "regarded as" prong.320 Instead,
if a person is disqualified on the basis of an actual or perceived
physical or mental condition, and the employer can articulate no
legitimate job-related reason for the rejection, a perceived concern
about employing persons with disabilities could be inferred and the
plaintiff would qualify for coverage under the "regarded as" test.3 2 1
C. Giving Adequate Protection Through Separate Definitions
The current three-prong system makes sense. However, those
seeking employment accommodations for "actual disabilities" should
meet a more difficult burden of proof than those who claim to be
victims of stereotypical misperceptions. Therefore, Congress should
clearly delineate the three prongs in Title I, providing a separate defi-
nition in place of the current "regarded as" prong.322
1. Maintaining the Current Definition for Plaintiffs Seeking
Reasonable Accommodations
Many commentators encourage a full overhaul of the disability
definition.3 23 In general, these scholars believe ADA litigation should
focus on the employer's actions and motivation rather than on
320 See iL, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.CA.N. 445, 453.
321 IAt at 30-31, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.CA.N. 445, 453. Based on this language, Arlene
Mayerson suggested:
If the employer refused to hire an individual based on an actual or per-
ceived physical or mental impairment, it must be presumed that the em-
ployer regarded the plaintiff as disabled. This is the only approach that
promotes the intent of the ADA-to ensure thatjob criteria based on physi-
cal or mental impairments are "job-related."
Mayerson, supra note 27, at 597.
Congress also considered controlled impairments. The Senate Report states: "An-
other important goal of the third prong of the definition is to ensure that persons with
medical conditions that are under control, and that therefore do not currently limit major
life activities, are not discriminated against on the basis of their medical conditions." S.
REP. No. 101-116, at 24 (1989). The use of the word "condition" instead of "disability" in
the passages above could suggest that Congress intended to ease the standard of proof in
"regarded as" cases. This reading, however, would undermine the clear language of the
statute, see 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2) (1994), and the most definite statement in the legislative
history on this point. See H.R. REP. No. 101485, pt. 3, at 29, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
445, 451-52. Nevertheless, Mayerson and others have used this alternative language to sug.
gest that a plaintiff must only prove that his employer took action based on an impairment,
not a "disability" in order to satisfy the "regarded as" prong. Although I sympathize with
Mayerson's goals in this area, the current statutory language simply cannot withstand such
a construction. Indeed, the inconsistent terminology used in the reports demonstrates
one of the problems with resorting to legislative history in statutory interpretation. For my
attempted resolution of this issue, see infra Part V.C.2.
322 Cf Friediand, supra note 313, at 194-97 (proposing a separate set of standards for
actual versus perceived disabilities).
323 See Burgdorf, supra note 4, at 568-72; Eichhorn, supra note 50, at 1473-74; Fried-
land, supra note 313, at 173.
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whether the employee is "truly disabled." 24 They argue that the
courts treat the disabled as "a specific protected class," 32 when in ac-
tuality, disability is only a societal creation-a group that has been
"singled out" and "treated differently."32 6 Therefore, in order to em-
brace the broad class that they believe Congress intended to protect,
some commentators suggest a statutory ban on employment decisions
that are based on mental and physical impairments and are not sup-
ported by business necessity.3 27
Although these recommendations might alter the initial focus of
ADA inquiry, they do not answer the ultimate question of what limita-
tions should be accommodated. In her depiction of an amended stat-
utory definition, Lisa Eichhom anticipates this criticism.328 She
contends that accommodations are not a form of special treatment
but rather "provide an equal opportunity to a person with a
disability."3 29
Under this scheme, however, we would still need to ask who is
disabled enough to require a leveled playing field and which limitations
affectjob performance to the point where accommodations should be
provided. Eichhorn herself explains that her expanded definition
would cover individuals with impairments that do not substantially
limit major life activities.330 She reasons, however, that if an individ-
ual's major life activities are not so limited, then that person's job abil-
ities would also not be limited by her impairment.3 3t Hence, no
accommodation would be required.332 In the end, however, we still
ask the basic question: Is this individual impaired enough to wanant
an accommodation? Therefore, the current "restrictive" definition of
disability should continue to apply to claimants seeking reasonable
accommodations.
This is not to say that the current disability definition functions as
it should. Assuming that line drawing of some sort is inevitable in the
realm of accommodations, an amended definition should make cer-
tain that those who do not require accommodations can still employ
324 See Burgdorf, supra note 4, at 571-72; Eichhorn, supra note 50, at 1472-73.
325 Eichhorn, supra note 50, at 1473.
326 Burgdorf, supra note 4, at 528.
327 See Bales, supra note 47, at 245; Eichhorn, supra note 50, at 1473-74.
328 Eichhorn, supra note 50, at 1476-77.
329 Id. at 1476; see also Diller, supra note 122, at 23 (noting that courts should not view
the ADA as social welfare or subsidy program, but as a "mandate for equality"); id. at 40
(comparing the ADA's utilization of a form of differential treatment uith that of traditional
affirmative action plans); 9 LARSON ET A.., supra note 141, § 154.01 (stating that the Act's
reasonable accommodation mandate does not "constitute required preferential
treatment").
330 See Eichhorn, supra note 50, at 1476.
331 See i
332 See id. at 1476-77.
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the statute to combat discrimination. This can be accomplished by
providing a separate set of rules for perceived limitations.
2. Preventing Discrimination Based on Stereotypical Attitudes
Under the current "regarded as" scheme, claimants have been
forced to present evidence of the employer's perceptions in order to
survive summary judgment.3 33 This is exceedingly difficult because
most claimants assert that their employer regards them as substantially
limited in their ability work.334 As such, a claimant must present evi-
dence that his employer believed he was foreclosed from working in a
class ofjobs.335 It is not enough that the individual present evidence
that his employer incorrectly regarded him as unfit for his position
based on antiquated beliefs about the individual's impairment' 6
Common sense might tell us that, in most cases, if an employer
refuses to hire or terminates an employee based on a belief that the
employee's impairment will prevent him from working at this em-
ployer's shop, then the employer probably also believes that the em-
ployee could not work anywhere else.3 3 7 With this in mind, Congress
should remove the first prong considerations of major life activities,
including working, and substantial limitations from third prong
analysis.338
333 See Mayerson, supra note 27, at 598.
334 See id.
335 See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471,491 (1999); see generally discussion
supra Part 1.B.2(b).
336 See Burgdorf, supra note 4, at 573; Mayerson, supra note 27, at 590, 598-600; see also
Leading Cases, supra note 212, at 347 (noting that a strict reading of the Sutton decision
would render the "regarded as" prong ineffective).
337 See Bales, supra note 47, at 245 (arguing instead for a "once is enough" standard in
"regarded as" claims); Brief of ACLU at 3, Sutton (No. 98-591) (stating that an employer
that "takes an adverse employment action against an individual because of a physical or
mental impairment necessarily regards that person as substantially limited in working" (em-
phasis added)); Harkin Brief, supra note 200, at 24-25. Senator Harkin's brief in the miti-
gating measures cases states:
It is not the rejection per se which gives rise to the "regarded as" claim, but
the natural and ordinary implication of such a rejection. Usually, if an em-
ployer rejects an individual from a job because of the individual's impair-
ment, it means the employer thinks the individual's impairment precludes
the individual from doing the types of tasks the job requires....
... The only way to give meaning to the "regarded as" prong is to interpret
the rejection from the job in question to signify the employer's view of the
plaintiff's ability to perform the class of jobs to which the job in question
belongs.
Id. at 24-25. But see Sutton, 527 U.S. at 489-90.
338 See Bales, supra note 47, at 245. As explained above, mentally ill plaintiffs asserting
a limitation in the major life activity of working face considerable obstacles. Moreover, die
Sutton decision solidified the difficult evidentiary burdens associated with such claims and
also called into question the theory's applicability. In "actual disability" and "record of"
cases, however, plaintiffs should retain the last-resort option of asserting the life activity of
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Instead, the third prong should target employers who take ad-
verse employment actions based on myths, fears, and stereotypes con-
cerning disabilities. The third prong should denote three categories
of discriminatory actions: (1) those in which the individual has no
impairment33 9 at all but the employer, due to myths, fears, or stereo-
types, takes an adverse action based on a belief that the individual has
an impairment; (2) those in which the individual has a history of an
impairment and the employer takes an adverse employment action
based on myths, fears, or stereotypes associated with that impairment;
and (3) those in which an individual currently has an impairment and
the employer takes an adverse employment action based on myths,
fears, or stereotypes associated with that impairment, whether those
beliefs are held by the employer or by others. Accordingly, Congress
should state that accommodations are only available for those who
meet the requirements of the first prong's disability definition. °0
Of course, the problem for past ADA plaintiffs has been the "pro-
tected class" requirement. Under the scheme this Note proposes, the
plaintiff would have to demonstrate that he has a history of ,an ADA
impairment, currently has such an impairment, or alternatively, that
evidence exists demonstrating that his employer mistakenly believed
he had such an impairment. This creates an inference that the em-
ployer based the adverse employment decision on myths, fears, or
stereotypes.
The burden of production then shifts to the employer to present
some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the action.ml Finally,
the burden shifts back to the employee to prove that the employer's
proffered reason was pretextua 3 42
working. For instance, if a plaintiff intends to use his physician-recommended leave of
absence as evidence of a disability or a record of a disability, he might not be able to
establish that he was substantially limited in his ability to care for himself. He might, how-
ever, be able to form a claim based on either a past or current limitation in the major life
activity of working.
339 The EEOC definition of impairment would still apply. Se 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)
(2000).
340 See explanation in supra Part IV.B.3(b).
341 See Olson v. Gen. Elec. Astrospace, 101 F.3d 947, 951 (3d Cir. 1996); see also H.R.
REP. No. 111-485, pt. 3, at 30-31 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445,453 (explaining
that if the employer does not "articulate (a] legitimate job-related reason for the rejection,
a perceived concern about employing persons ith disabilities could be inferred").
342 See Olson, 101 F.3d at 951.
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